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This research examines the impact of a CEO’s statements of aggressiveness on his 
or her organization’s competitive moves and subsequent performance.  Hypotheses were 
developed based on previous work in Upper Echelon Theory and competitive dynamics.  
Based on this prior literature, it was hypothesized aggressive statements by CEOs will be 
associated with more aggressive organizations.  It was also hypothesized these more 
aggressive organizations would display better performance than less aggressive 
organizations.  A content analysis of letters to shareholders and trade publications was 
performed.  This data was analyzed using multiple regression in SPSS 17 to test the 
hypotheses that aggressive statements by CEOs are associated with aggressive 
organizations and higher performance.  Aggression scores for the content analysis were 
generated using the software package DICTION.  The sample for the study was the 
organizations with the most revenue in two industries, automobile manufacturing and 
retailing.  Data collection covered a five-year time span from 2003-2007, with 
performance data lagged one year.  Control variables employed included CEO tenure, 
CEO background, organization size, and organization age.  The findings indicate that 
CEO statements of aggressiveness do not significantly impact the competitive 
aggressiveness or the performance of their organizations.  The implications of these 
findings are discussed and potential avenues for future research in the area are outlined.   
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Chapter One: 
Overview of the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
 In these difficult times as the economy has shifted from a period of growth to one 
of the worst recessions in history, we are reminded of the responsibility that is ascribed to 
CEOs and their impact on their respective organizations.  “Rock star” CEOs are 
showered with praise in the popular press for successfully leading organizations through 
these difficult times while others are vilified for their role in an organization’s collapse.  
For example, the impact of Steve Jobs was recently summed up in a Washington Post 
article with the quote “maybe no American chief executive is perceived as being more 
crucial to his company’s future than Jobs is to Apple’s” (Ahrens, 2009).  On the other 
hand, Conger and Nadler (2004) provide a long list of recent high-profile CEOs who had 
short tenures, among them Richard McGinn at Lucent Technologies and Douglas Ivester 
at Coca-Cola.  Conger and Nadler go on to note CEO failure after a short time with the 
organization often results in the blame falling on one individual, the CEO, regardless of 
other forces involved in the situation. 
 The impact that top management can have on their organizations is widely 
recognized in academic literature.  As noted by Hambrick and Mason (1984), there was 
widespread anecdotal evidence of this influence long before their initial development of 
Upper Echelon theory, which now provides the basis for much of the research in the area.  
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This seminal work in the strategy literature outlined the potential for organizational 
outcomes to be studied as a reflection of the dominant coalition in the organization (top 
management).  In doing so, Hambrick and Mason drew on prior work examining the 
behavioral factors that influence decisions (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958) 
and the strategic choice viewpoint (Child, 1972), which is important because, without 
choice, there would be no opportunity for top management to influence the eventual 
outcomes of their organizations (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).  They also addressed 
concerns with research of the time that attempted to show top management did not matter 
and that other factors, such as the environment, had more of an impact on the outcomes 
achieved by organizations. 
 The answers to the primary questions surrounding this topic – how much freedom 
do managers have to choose and to what extent do these choices impact the organization 
– have been a topic of discussion since the beginnings of the discipline.  Flynn and Weiss 
(1987:160) identified this conversation as “one of the most heated debates” in the last 15 
years of strategy and organization theory research.  There are a number of alternative 
theories that present competing answers to these questions.  Murray (1976) presented in 
his research that managers did not formulate strategy so much as they negotiated it with 
powerful external parties.  The influence of and limitations resulting from the 
environment and actors in the environment is a common theme across many of the 
alternative explanations.  Some of the most commonly cited include Resource 
Dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), Population Ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), 
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Institutional Theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and Contingency Theory (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967).  To add to the debate, both approaches can cite research that supports their 
view (Flynn & Weiss, 1987; Murray Jr, 1976).  Bourgeois (1984) expressed concern that, 
while such deterministic theories may be useful for research purposes, their use would 
reduce the richness of the strategy process and possibly constrain future advancement 
within the discipline of strategic management.   
 If top management does have a choice and can influence the strategy an 
organization pursues, then what are the implications for the performance of the 
organization as a result of these choices?  This is an area that has received a great deal of 
empirical attention in the literature across a variety of contexts and management 
characteristics, although it is also not without varying viewpoints and empirical 
outcomes.  Mackey (2008), for example, found the effects of CEOs on firm performance 
to be greater than that of the industry or corporation.  Research by Beatty and Zaja (1987) 
shows stock market participants believe CEOs matter, finding a relationship between 
stock price and the announcement of CEO succession.  On the other hand, the results of a 
study by Murray (1989) revealed a significant difference across industries in the impact 
of top management teams on performance, with only one of the four characteristics 
identified having a relationship with performance for one of the industries in the study. 
It is against this background that this study seeks to enrich the literature by 
examining how top management, specifically CEOs, can influence the actions and 
performance of their organizations by considering the aggressiveness of statements made 
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by CEOs.  In order to properly address this issue, this work draws from research on 
Upper Echelon Theory, competitive dynamics, and organization performance. 
 
1.1.1Upper Echelons and Top Management Teams 
Taking the approach prescribed by an Upper Echelon viewpoint provides three 
benefits, as outlined by Hambrick and Mason (1984a) in their initial article.  The first of 
these is the potential for improved prediction of organization outcomes.  The second is 
the possibility of providing practical advice on how to effectively develop and select 
executives.  Finally, taking this approach may allow the results to be used by executives 
as a guide to help them predict what strategies and responses their competition will likely 
pursue.  It is at this intersection between top management and competitive dynamics 
where this study is focused. 
 As mentioned earlier, Upper Echelon theory has been applied in a number of 
contexts as well as in studies utilizing a wide variety of variables and considering several 
important moderators.  An example of one such moderator is executive job demands, 
which seeks to explain how the difficulty of a top management position influences 
strategic decisions (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005).  Although there has not yet 
been a direct test of the propositions related to executive job demands, the theory is that 
those facing greater job demands will, in general, tend to rely on their own heuristics to 
help them deal with the high demands, allowing their personal characteristics to have a 
greater impact on the organization’s outcomes.   
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1.1.2 Managerial Discretion  
Managerial discretion was introduced as a moderator that helped to bridge the gap 
between Upper Echelon Theory and Institutional Theory and Population Ecology 
(Hambrick et al., 1987).  This moderator provides insight as to under what circumstances 
top management may or may not have an impact on the organization.  When top 
managers are provided more discretion, they will have the opportunity to influence 
organization outcomes.  In situations where top managers are not provided much 
discretion, their impact on the organization will be lessened or possibly eliminated.   
 It is also important to note here the inclusion of Upper Echelon theory in the 
larger context of strategic leadership.  Strategic leadership has been defined as “focuses 
on the people who have overall responsibility for an organization – the characteristics of 
those people, what they do, and how they do it” (Hambrick, 1989:6).  Strategic leaders 
must handle tasks that involve a wide range of activities within the organization (i.e 
operations, finance, etc.) while considering the external and internal factors that may 
impact the organization (Hambrick, 1989).  All of this is within a context of complexity, 
ambiguity, and information overload; a fact that is recognized in the Upper Echelon 
approach.  The relationship between strategic leadership and Upper Echelons is most 
apparent in the study of how strategic leadership impacts the ultimate behaviors and 
outcomes of the organization (Hambrick, 1989).  The importance of this area of study 
was noted by Schendel (1989), who stated that those individuals at the top level of 
organizations must be worthy of study because they are regarded as important and 
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unique, along with evidence suggesting that strategic leadership differs from leadership at 
other levels of the organization. 
 
1.1.3 Top Management and Organization Performance 
The connection between top management teams and the performance of 
organizations is an important link that has received a great deal of attention in the 
literature.  A popular example from the literature is top management team heterogeneity 
(or the lack thereof).  Heterogeneity has been found to have an impact on firm 
performance, although the magnitude of this impact may also depend on other factors, 
such as industry (Murray, 1989).  Pegels, Song, and Yang (2000) went a step further and 
found performance implications for top management team characteristics regarding how 
well team heterogeneity matched with other teams in the firm’s competitive group. 
In addition, this connection has been studied in firms of varying sizes and ages, 
not just large, multi-national organizations.  Top management team size and 
heterogeneity have been considered along with the novelty of the organization in the 
context of new ventures (Amason, Shrader, & Tompson, 2006) in regards to 
performance.  As for different sizes of organizations, Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, and Veiga 
(2006) found a relationship between top management team behavioral integration and 
ambidextrous orientation, a relationship which was related to performance, in small- and 
medium-sized organizations.   
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1.1.4 Competitive Dynamics, Hypercompetition, and Competitive Aggressiveness 
 Another foundation of this research is the literature on competitive dynamics and, 
within the area, hypercompetition and competitive aggressiveness.  The competitive 
dynamics literature focuses on how competitive advantages, competitors, and 
performance (of the firm and the industry) are impacted by the actions and reactions of 
those firms in competition (Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001).  Competitive dynamics 
research has been noted as focusing on the observable characteristics of market moves 
such as speed, simplicity, and, most applicable for this study, aggressiveness (Grimm, 
Lee, & Smith, 2005).  Chen, Smith, and Grimm (1992) outlined the importance of 
responses to actions among competitors, developing four important characteristics of 
actions that will help identify the likely response: competitive impact, attack intensity, 
implementation requirement, and type of action.   
 Three primary characteristics of competitive dynamics research are laid out by  
Smith et al. (2001): a focus on the real behaviors and actions of firms, competitive 
interdependence, and connecting these actions and reactions to their performance 
consequences.  Based on their review of competitive dynamics literature, Smith et al. 
(2001) state there is generally considered to be a strong connection between competitive 
actions/reactions and the top management of an organization, a connection important to 
this research that will be revisited later.  They also note an important link in the literature 
between aggressive actions and improved performance – a link related to the expected 
outcome of one of the primary research questions in this study. 
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 Empirical work in the area has addressed a variety of potential factors exerting an 
influence on the competitive dynamics of an industry.  The number of responses and the 
speed of these responses have been associated with a number of factors including the 
number of competitors impacted by the action and the threat posed by such actions 
(Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992b).  While Chen et al. (1992b) addressed only responses, 
Chen and MacMillian (1992) added to the research on competitive dynamics by including 
competitive situations in which there was no response.  This allowed the authors to 
present insights into what may lead to a lack of response to a competitive action, 
including the irreversibility of the potential response and the competitor’s dependence on 
the market segment in which the action was taken.   
  
1.1.5 Competitive Aggressiveness 
Competitive aggressiveness has been associated with a wide range of dimensions 
(Covin & Covin, 1990), including Porter’s generic strategies (1985), first-mover 
advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988), and preemptive strategies (MacMillan, 
1983).  Ferrier (2001) outlined the dimensions of a competitive attack and how these 
could influence competitive aggressiveness.  The four dimensions that are related to 
competitive aggressiveness are attack volume, duration, complexity, and unpredictability.  
Ferrier also found that top management team characteristics – in this case heterogeneity – 
could influence competitive aggressiveness through some of the dimensions mentioned 
above.  These results also presented evidence of a relationship between competitive 
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aggressiveness and firm performance in the form of market share.  In a related study, 
Ferrier and colleagues (2002) found current performance can also influence competitive 
aggressiveness, with firms that had been poor performers displaying less competitive 
aggressiveness.  On the other hand, competitive aggressiveness, in combination with top 
management characteristics, has also been presented as a potential source of competitive 
advantage leading to improved performance (Lin, 2006). 
The context in which the organization operates also influences competitive 
aggressiveness.  Prior research suggests that poor performing firms in industries with 
high barriers to entry will actually compete more aggressively (Ferrier, Mac 
Fhionnlaoich, Smith, & Grimm, 2002b).  Competitive aggressiveness has also been 
utilized in the Entrepreneurship literature through, among other applications, its inclusion 
in Lumpkins and Dess’s (1996) entrepreneurial orientation construct. Covin and Covin 
(1990), in their application of competitive aggressiveness in a small business context, 
suggest the technological sophistication and hostility present in an organization’s 
environment will influence the performance outcomes of competitive aggressiveness.  
This leads to the final foundation for this study – discussion of organization performance 
measures.   
 
1.1.6 Organization Performance 
 A variety of methods for measuring organization performance have been 
presented.  In the strategy literature, these measures take on an additional level of 
10 
 
importance given the need in the discipline to interpret performance data (Bowman, 
Singh, & Thomas, 2002) and the traditional focus on those factors that influence 
performance (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 1999).  This emphasis on performance is also 
mentioned by Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece (1991), who note the strategy discipline’s 
focus on strategic processes and the performance consequences of these processes.  
Finally, inclusion and appropriate measurement of performance is important because of 
the practical suggestions that may be made available to practicing managers 
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987).  To this end, the search for and identification of 
effective measures of performance are often discussed in the literature.  
 Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) call the difficulty measuring performance in 
organization settings one of the “thorniest” issues that an academic researcher must face.  
Their overview of performance measures views such measures in strategy as a subset of 
organization effectiveness that includes financial and operational performance measures.  
A follow-up article by Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1987) classified measures of 
performance by data source (primary or secondary) and mode of assessment (objective or 
perceptual).  The results of a convergence analysis in the article provided evidence that 
there is not necessarily one superior method of analyzing organization performance.   
 Within the other areas that serve as the foundation for this research, a wide variety 
of performance measures have been utilized.  For the Upper Echelon stream, one study 
utilized sales growth, profitability, and stock market returns (Amason et al., 2006), while 
another focused on CEO self-report of market share growth, sales growth, return on 
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equity, and return on assets relative to competitors (Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 
2006).  The competitive dynamics stream provided performance measures such as 
abnormal stock returns (Ferrier & Hun, 2002a) and a 5-point Likert scale considering 
respondent satisfaction with current organization performance on nine items, including 
cash flow, net profit, and return on investment (Covin et al., 1990) that had been adapted 
from a prior study (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984).  It should be noted the sample of some 
of the cited studies were small businesses, while others included large corporations.   
 
1.2 Statement of the Primary Research Questions 
 The preceding discussion has examined the Upper Echelons literature regarding 
the potential for CEO characteristics to influence the outcomes of organizations.  
However, in spite of the research in the area, questions still remain regarding how the top 
management team influences the decision process (Papadakis, 2006; Papadakis & 
Barwise, 2002) and what the eventual outcomes of these processes are (Rajagopalan, 
Rasheed, & Datta, 1993).  If we assume that organizations do become a reflection of their 
top managers, then what happens when a CEO makes statements of aggressiveness?  This 
leads to the first primary research question, “Are organizations with aggressive CEOs 
more likely to undertake aggressive competitive actions?” 
 An important characteristic of Strategy research is the focus on the performance 
impacts of the various factors examined (Venkatraman et al., 1987).  Various studies 
have examined the link between managerial characteristics and the outcomes for which 
12 
 
the manager is responsible (i.e. Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984; Gupta, 1984).  Thus, this 
study would be ignoring one of the founding tenants of strategy research if the impact on 
performance was not included.  This leads to the second primary research question, “Do 
organizations whose strategic actions are in alignment with the aggressiveness of their 
CEOs perform better?”  
 
1.3 Additional Research Questions 
 Gupta (1984) noted that the important question when studying the impact of top 
management is no longer if they matter, but how much they matter.  Gupta calls for 
research to take into account various aspects of the environment when examining the 
impact of management on strategy.  In a related study on the impact of CEOs on the 
decision process itself, Papadakis (2006) suggested that context variables have a greater 
impact than the CEOs themselves.  In order to address this concern, the following 
additional research questions are presented. 
-“Is the relationship between CEO aggressiveness, aggressive strategic moves, and 
organization performance affected by CEO tenure or functional expertise?” 
-“Is the relationship between CEO aggressiveness, aggressive strategic moves, and 
organization performance affected by firm age or size?” 
-“Is the relationship between CEO aggressiveness, aggressive strategic moves, and 
organization performance affected by industry?” 
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1.4 Proposed Research Model 
 It is proposed by this research model that CEO statements of aggressiveness will 
influence the competitive aggressiveness of the organizations they lead, as well as the 
performance of the organization.  The competitive aggressiveness of the organizations is 
proposed to also impact firm performance.  The model also considers the possibility that 
it is the interaction of CEO statements of aggressiveness and organization competitive 
aggressiveness that influences organization performance.  These relationships are 
discussed in greater detail and formal hypotheses developed in Chapter Two. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Proposed Research Model 
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1.5 Methodology of the Study 
 In order to answer these research questions, a sample of the 20 largest 
organizations in two different industries (automobile manufacturers and retailers) was 
pursued, providing a potential sample of 40 organizations.  The selection of the largest 
companies helps ensure that sufficient data points will be available, while the selection of 
two different industries allows for identification of industry effects.  DICTION software 
was utilized to perform a content analysis of various sources such as letters to 
shareholders and trade publications in order to gather data regarding the aggressiveness 
of CEOs and their organizations.  This information was combined with publicly available 
performance data to test the hypotheses utilizing multiple regression in SPSS 17.  Data 
was collected for the period from 2003-2007 and performance was lagged one year in 
order to provide time for strategic moves to have an impact.   
 
1.6 Importance of the Study 
 In order to understand the reasons organizations take the actions that they do, it is 
important to know the various characteristics of top management and how these 
characteristics affect firm performance (Cannella Jr, 2001).  The strategic actions of 
organizations do not take place unless top management makes the decision to do so 
(Smith et al., 2001).  These characteristics of top management have regularly been 
identified as an important area for continued research in the strategy literature (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984) and as having an impact on the performance of the firm (Patzelt, zu 
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Knyphausen-Aufse, & Nikol, 2008; Pegels, Song, & Baik, 2000).  The present study also 
answers calls in the literature seeking increased attention to the psychological aspects 
influencing strategy (Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002).  Another area of research whose 
understanding would be expanded by the results of this study is that of competitive 
dynamics.  As noted by Smith, Ferrier, and Ndofor (2001), there is a need for research 
that seeks to include facets from within the organization in the study of actions and 
reactions in the competitive dynamic between organizations. 
As previously noted, research on Upper Echelons can provide an opportunity to 
improve prediction of organization outcomes for both researchers and practicing 
executives (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  While Hambrick and Mason’s original work 
called for the use of background characteristics to predict behavior (due to the difficulty 
examining psychological characteristics), this research seeks to add another facet.  More 
recently, Hambrick (2007) called for more research examining the actual psychological 
processes at work in the theory. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Dissertation 
 This initial chapter has presented the topic for this study, examined the 
importance of this research to the field of strategy, and outlined the research questions to 
be addressed by the study.  The following chapter provides a more detailed review of the 
literature in the area of Upper Echelon theory and the implications of a CEO’s impact on 
firm performance.  The review also includes an overview of the literature on competitive 
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aggressiveness.  Immediately following the literature review in Chapter 2, hypotheses are 
developed with regard to the relationships outlined above and the research model.  The 
research design, measures, sample, and methodology are the focus of Chapter Three.  
Chapter Four will present the results of the data analysis and discussion of individual 
hypotheses.  Finally, Chapter Five includes a discussion of the study results, implications 
for researchers and practitioners, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future 
research. 
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Chapter Two: 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 As was discussed in Chapter One, this research seeks to study the relationships 
between CEO statements of aggressiveness, aggressive competitive moves, and 
organization performance.  This chapter presents development of hypotheses related to 
these relationships and a discussion of the related literature.  It also discusses where this 
study fits in the literature and provides support for the importance of studying these 
relationships. This chapter is divided into three sections.  The initial section of the chapter 
provides an overview of extant research in the area of Upper Echelon Theory.  The next 
section presents the empirical and theoretical work in the area of management discretion, 
a subset of Upper Echelon Theory, which provides the basis for the assertion that 
characteristics of top management, in this case CEOs’, impact organization performance.  
Third, research in the area of competitive dynamics and, more specifically competitive 
aggressiveness, is examined with regards to how such behaviors may influence firm 
performance.   
 The literature review is followed by development of hypotheses and presentation 
of the research model.  The first relationship considered is that of CEO aggressiveness 
and the firm’s eventual aggressive competitive moves or lack thereof.  This relationship 
is developed by utilizing the theoretical foundation of management discretion (Hambrick 
et al., 1987).  Next, the link between aggressive competitive moves and organization 
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performance is developed based on the literature on competitive aggressiveness and 
competitive dynamics.  The third association considered is that of CEO aggressiveness 
and organization performance.  Finally, prior research from the above areas is integrated 
to develop hypotheses with regards to how the interaction of CEO aggressiveness and the 
aggressiveness of organizations may influence organization performance. 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 This section of Chapter Two provides an overview of the work in Upper Echelon 
Theory.  While the primary focus is on management discretion as a theoretical 
underpinning for why CEO aggressiveness will impact organization aggressiveness, it is 
important to place it in the proper context.  In this case, management discretion was 
developed from and has its basis in Upper Echelon Theory.  Following the overview of 
Upper Echelon Theory, extant research examining management discretion is reviewed.  
This review of the area will include discussion of factors such as what influences the 
amount of discretion a top manager may have and what are the consequences of varying 
levels of discretion.  The final section of the literature review focuses on competitive 
aggressiveness, what competitive moves are generally considered aggressive, and the 
performance implications of these actions for firms.   
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2.1.1 Upper Echelon Theory Overview 
 Upper Echelon Theory was initially developed by Hambrick and Mason in 1984.  
Their approach was to go beyond the anecdotal evidence supporting the view that 
organization outcomes are a reflection of the cognitions and values of top management 
and develop an approach that would allow for empirical tests of the hypothesis.  They 
also outlined three benefits of using an Upper Echelons perspective: better opportunity 
for scholars to predict organization outcomes, better selection of executives, and 
prediction of competitive moves by practicing managers.   
 The theory is based on the belief that managers cannot possibly interpret 
everything occurring in their environment.  This process is limited even more by the 
manager perceiving only some of the factors that remain.  Those factors that are 
identified in this selective perception process will then be interpreted by the top manager 
in a manner consistent with their personal biases and cognitions.  In order to help identify 
how managers may impact strategic decisions through these processes, Hambrick and 
Mason suggested a focus on characteristics of managers that could be readily observed, 
such as demographics.  This was done in order to address the difficulties that arise in 
collecting psychological data from top managers, the need to obtain easily observable 
measures, and to take advantage of characteristics that may not have a related 
psychological counterpart.  This supports the approach that is taken in this study, using 
public statements as an observable proxy for the managerial characteristic of 
aggressiveness.  Hambrick and Mason outlined a number of characteristics and their 
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potential influences including age, functional track, formal education, socioeconomic 
background, and financial position.  Many of these characteristics have been empirically 
studied in order to test Hambrick and Mason’s propositions and several of these studies 
are presented later in this literature review.   
  
2.1.2 Initial Empirical Upper Echelon Theory Research 
One of the first studies to offer an empirical test related to Upper Echelon Theory 
was that of Chaganti and Sambharya (1987).  Their study considered the relationship of 
top management functional backgrounds and career histories with regards to how 
prevalent they would be in organizations displaying specific approaches from Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) typology of strategies.  They did find support for their hypothesis that 
having more individuals hired from outside the organization as part of the top 
management team would be true of firms pursuing an analyzer approach.  However, they 
also suggest the importance of examining the link between environmental characteristics 
and top management characteristics when examining inter-industry situations.  Although 
the sample of organizations was somewhat limited, their research did present a 
relationship between management characteristics and the strategy pursued by these 
organizations.  Kerr and Jackofsky (1989) also considered links between management 
characteristics and other factors; selection versus development of top management in 
relation to matching management skills and organization strategy in this case.  They 
21 
 
propose that organizations with top managers whose characteristics align with the 
strategy will be more effective.   
 While Kerr and Jackofsky considered matching top management to strategies, 
Noel (1989) examined the effect CEOs have on the formulation of strategies.  Noel 
observed CEOs for a month to develop propositions regarding the impact that they have 
on strategy formulation.  One important proposition was that the CEO will determine a 
strategic core, which will influence what strategic issues receive attention within the 
organization.  Noel also presents CEOs as providing continuity within the organization 
and that their obsessions will have a major influence on the organization’s strategy and 
how the CEOs operate.  The overall result of this research was that strategies in the 
organizations studied developed from the CEOs transforming their intentions into daily 
actions. 
 One of the first attempts to understand the psychological processes explaining 
how  observed characteristics of top management influence organization outcomes was 
undertaken by Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson (1993).  In order to do so, they 
focused on the top manager’s commitment to the status quo as the psychological factor.  
Their work provided a number of factors, such as tenure and current organization 
performance, which could lead to an increased commitment to the status quo.  The results 
present a number of factors that are positively related to commitment to the status quo 
including industry tenure (which was not simply a proxy for age and was stronger than 
organization tenure) and, to a point, current organization performance.  It is interesting to 
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note that the amount of perceived managerial discretion, the subject of the next section of 
the literature review, moderated how current organization performance impacted 
commitment to the status quo.  As for the impact on potential organization outcomes, 
factors such as industry tenure and current firm performance influenced commitment to 
the status quo with regards to the organization’s strategy and future leadership. 
 In line with discussion of the organization’s future leadership, Miller’s (1993) 
research, while not specifically mentioning an Upper Echelon approach, provides 
additional support for the impact of CEOs on their organizations by studying the 
organization consequences of a CEO succession.  One impact on the organization that 
resulted from changing CEOs was a wider distribution of power within the organization.  
The results also showed that CEO successions were related to changes in strategies and 
structures for the organizations.  Another study on succession that provides similar 
insights is that by Wiersema (1992).  In this study, Wiersema ties different types of 
succession events (new CEO is an insider or an outsider) to the changes in organization 
strategy that follow.  The hypothesis, based on factors such as promotion of similar 
individuals in the case of internal succession and escalation of commitment, which stated 
that external succession would lead to greater strategic changes following the succession, 
was supported.  This supports the assertion that the characteristics of those promoted in 
the succession event had an impact on the strategic choices that followed, a finding in 
line with the importance and uniqueness of succession events as outlined by Kesner and 
Sebora (1994). 
23 
 
2.1.3 Impact of Managerial Characteristics 
Researchers have also addressed specific areas of strategy differences based on 
top management characteristics.  One such study was that by Sambharya (1996), which 
sought to determine the relationship between the top management team backgrounds and 
international diversification strategies of their organizations.  This was one of the first 
studies to consider Upper Echelon theory in an international context.  The study 
considered a number of top management team characteristics that could be related with 
higher amounts of international diversification including mean years of international 
experience, heterogeneity of international experience, and proportion with international 
experience among the top management team.  In general, the results showed a positive 
relationship between the aforementioned factors and the amount of international 
diversification in a firm.  However, it is noted that it may be possible the top management 
teams might have gained that international experience because they worked for an 
organization that was already diversified in such a way.   
 A different approach to studying Upper Echelons in an international context was 
taken by Wiersema and Bird (1996).  They hypothesized that two fundamental 
assumptions would hold across cultures, the United States and Japan in this case.  One 
such assumption was that the competencies needed to successfully pursue a strategy 
would vary depending upon the strategy pursued.  The other assumption was that the 
skills and cognitions of managers will differ.  Their findings supported the two previously 
mentioned assumptions.  However, there were some relationships found in research 
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performed in the United States that did not generalize to the Japanese sample.  Functional 
backgrounds of top management did not have the same impact in Japan as in the United 
States.  This was suggested as being due to Japanese managers obtaining a broader 
understanding of their organizations regardless of functional background.  They also 
found that the diversity in traits among top management was more important than the 
traits themselves.   
Diversity was also at the center of the approach taken by Miller, Burke, and Glick 
(1998).  This research considered the diversity in cognitions among the top management 
team, suggesting that previous mixed results with regards to executive diversity was due 
to a focus on demographic diversity or not considering process variables.  Diversity 
among top management has been identified with both positive and negative effects.  
Some arguments that support positive effects include diversity leading to awareness of 
more issues and the need to resolve disagreements leading to additional resources being 
made available.  Disagreements over deeply-ingrained opinions that will not be 
compromised and difficulty communicating among those with different cognitions are 
cited as supporting arguments for the position that diversity has a negative effect.  The 
main focus of the article was to identify which position is correct with regards to the 
comprehensiveness of strategic planning and decision-making.  In general, the results 
supported the view that the downsides of cognitive diversity overcome the positive 
benefits from such diversity. 
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Returning to the topic of managerial discretion across national boundaries, 
Crossland and Hambrick (2007), Crossland (2007), and Crossland (2009) provide 
additional insights into how the environment within different countries affects managerial 
discretion.  Each study considered different antecedents stemming from national 
differences that would impact the discretion of managers within countries.  Crossland 
(2007) included labor market flexibility, ownership structures, cultural values, and legal 
traditions.  Crossland and Hambrick (2007) also considered values and ownership 
structures, but added board governance as their third antecedent.  The two studies also 
varied in the number of countries included in the analysis and the approach to identifying 
impacts on managerial discretion.  Crossland (2007) included 24 countries and utilized 
the four variables already mentioned to develop a taxonomy of discretion groups: high-
discretion, norm-constrained, rule-constrained, and low-discretion. 
On the other hand, Crossland and Hambrick (2007) included only three countries 
in their study and developed a foundation for their hypothesis that CEOs in the U.S. have 
greater discretion and, thus, greater impact on firm performance, than CEOs in Japan or 
Germany.  CEOs from the U.S. accounted for more performance variance than their 
Japanese counterparts for all of the dependent performance variables (return on assets, 
return on sales, sales growth, and market-to-book value).  The results were not as 
consistent when comparing U.S. and German CEOs, but overall still supported the 
hypothesis that U.S. CEOs have a greater impact.  Utilizing strategic choice variables 
such as total assets divided by number of employees, Crossland and Hambrick (2007) 
26 
 
also provided insights as to how the level of discretion available impacts changes in such 
variables.  Although other variables such as industry explained more variance in the 
analysis, they still found some support for the hypothesis that those CEOs with greater 
discretion could have more influence on such variables.   
Crossland (2009) considered 15 countries and 746 organizations over a ten-year 
timeframe in order to examine the construct validity of discretion at a national level of 
analysis.  This study included many of the same variables mentioned in the prior two 
studies including legal traditions and cultural norms related to autonomy and tolerance of 
unpredictability.  Once again, the results supported the hypothesis that greater managerial 
discretion is associated with a larger impact of CEOs on firm performance.  Specifically, 
this relationship held true for return on assets, return on invested capital, return on sales, 
and market-to-book ratios. 
While Miller and colleagues examined the differences in cognitions, several 
studies have addressed the issue of what causes these differences.  Chattopadhyay et al 
(1999) sought to determine the process by which executives come to have these differing 
cognitions.  They attempted to do so by comparing two competing theories: executive 
beliefs are shaped by their functional background and executive beliefs are formed based 
on the beliefs of other members of the Upper Echelon.  While their results did not allow 
for a determination of causality, the results did generally support the theory that the 
beliefs of the top management of an organization are more closely related to the beliefs of 
other top managers as opposed to the top manager’s functional background.  Their 
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suggestion based on the findings is that further examination of functional backgrounds 
may not be a good area for future research.  Overall, their study provides important 
insights into an antecedent of one aspect of top managers that may influence organization 
outcomes.   
The innovation of an organization was identified by Bantel and Jackson (1989) as 
the dependent variable of interest for their Upper Echelon research.  Top management 
characteristics explained more variance in innovation than either the size of the 
organization or the location.  This research provided good support for the Upper Echelon 
perspective by looking at another potential organization outcome (innovation) and 
considering a wide range of top management characteristics.   
A unique approach in Upper Echelon literature was taken by Hambrick and 
Cannella (2004) and Marcel (2009).  Combined, these two articles provide insights into 
various factors that may lead to the top management team including a COO and the 
performance implications thereof.  One interesting finding from these studies was that 
CEO characteristics such as functional background (Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 2004) were 
related to the likelihood of having a COO.  With regards to performance, the two studies 
varied in their findings.  While Marcel’s research found a positive relationship between 
having a COO and firm performance, having a COO was identified with lower firm 
performance in the study by Hambrick and Cannella.  Marcel suggests this may be due to 
the different industries used in the samples and the data collection approach (cross-
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sectional for Marcel and longitudinally over the CEO’s tenure for Hambrick and 
Cannella). 
 
2.1.4 Performance Impact in Upper Echelons Research 
As mentioned previously, the focus on performance impact is common in the 
strategy literature in general and also within Upper Echelons research.  CEOs have been 
found to exert a significant effect on firm performance.  For example, CEOs accounted 
for 29.2% of the variance in firm performance, a much larger portion than either firm 
(7.9%) or industry (6.2%) in a study by Mackey (2008).  Mackey’s study found that 
CEOs accounted for the largest portion of variance in segment performance as well when 
compared to the same two alternatives.  Mackey also mentions limitations that may 
coincide with the amount of managerial discretion a CEO has, a topic that is reviewed in 
the next section.   
Combining management backgrounds with performance (stock price in IPOs) is 
suggested by Zhang and Wiersema (2009), who take a different approach to the impact of 
CEOs on firm performance.  Their study considers how CEO backgrounds, a common 
Upper Echelon component, signals firm quality and influences IPO valuation; although 
variables such as CEO age were also included in the analysis.  In this case, the 
background characteristic examined was CEO certification under SEC regulations in 
which CEOs must sign off on financial reports that could later lead to legal action if such 
reports are found to be incorrect.  Their findings suggest that there is indeed a 
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relationship between CEO characteristics, CEO certification, and abnormal returns in an 
IPO.   
 The performance impact in Upper Echelons research has also considered 
competitive dynamics and strategic human resource management (SHRM) (Lin & Shih, 
2008).  The unique contribution of Lin and Shih (2008) was the use of Upper Echelons 
and competitive aggressiveness to explain how SHRM systems can impact firm 
performance as a potential competitive advantage.  Overall, it appears that SHRM 
systems can impact top management characteristics, which in turn influence firm 
aggressiveness, leading to improved performance.  However, it should be noted that the 
mediation effect was only partial, suggesting that there are other important factors. 
As can be seen from the review, a number of CEO characteristics have been 
shown to impact a variety of aspects related to their organizations.  However, personality 
has not been heavily researched.  While the literature suggests that CEO personality may 
have an impact, few studies have addressed this empirically.  This is an area in the 
research the present study seeks to address.   
 
2.2 Managerial Discretion 
 The Upper Echelon view was initially at odds with other approaches such as 
population ecology (Hannan et al., 1984) and the inertial view (Hall, 1977) that 
organizations are, to a point, at the mercy of external events.  While these views posited 
that managers matter very little if at all in the ultimate outcomes of the organization, 
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Upper Echelon Theory was based on the Strategic Choice (Child, 1972) approach that top 
managers do matter and their decisions can influence the organization.  Some have 
suggested that rather than asking if top management matters, research should focus on 
how much top management matters (Papadakis et al., 2002).  In order to help bridge these 
two views, Hambrick developed managerial discretion, which presents to what extent 
managers will be able to influence organization outcomes.   
Managerial discretion, while previously mentioned in the management literature 
(Montanari, 1978), was first defined in the academic management literature by Hambrick 
and Finkelstein (1987) with the aforementioned intention of providing a connection 
between deterministic and choice theories.  While the term has also been utilized in the 
economic literature in regards to the freedom to pursue self-interest (Shen & Cho, 2005), 
the primary focus here will be on Hambrick and Finkelstein’s approach.   
Managerial discretion has also been utilized to connect the resource dependence 
approach and stakeholder theory (Berman, Phillips, & Wicks, 2005).  Managerial 
discretion was utilized because it had been previously used to discuss competing theories 
when one provides a great deal of credit to management and the other does not.  Berman 
et al.’s (2005) hypotheses all took a resource dependence approach and were not 
supported.  Support was found for the moderating effect of managerial discretion with 
regards to resource dependence and the relationship with stakeholders.  
 Contingency Theory has also been the subject of research that utilized managerial 
discretion to address theoretical disagreements.  Peteraf and Reed (2007) addressed 
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charges of determinism leveled against Contingency Theory by providing discretion as 
the mechanism through which managers actively attempt to adapt to various constraints.  
The research utilized the airline industry surrounding the time of deregulation to take 
advantage of the opportunity provided by the change in discretion; low discretion under 
regulation and higher discretion following deregulation.  The results show that external 
factors such as regulation do impact the discretion of managers both directly (operational 
options that are available) and indirectly (administrative practices).  When applied to 
Contingency Theory, the results support the view that fit with the environment 
outperforms a “best practice”.  At the intersection of Contingency Theory and managerial 
discretion, they found that managers used their new discretion to change the approach of 
the organization to better fit the new environment and to take actions in higher discretion 
areas in an attempt to address lower discretion areas.   
 The use of the airline industry as a sample has been popular due to the ability to 
examine the effects of regulation and deregulation.  Goll, Brown-Johnson, and Rasheed 
(2008) examined the airline industry from 1972 to 1995, utilizing regulation and 
deregulation as proxies for the amount of managerial discretion.  Their results showed 
that various characteristics of top management were related to organization outcomes and 
strategies; however, the relationship was affected by firm context, industry regulation in 
this instance.   
 When applied to Stakeholder Theory, managerial discretion has been proposed as 
addressing the gap between determinism and managerialism (Phillips, Berman, Johnson-
32 
 
Cramer, & Elms, 2007).  As utilized before, managerial discretion provides an 
explanation for how managerial choices may vary in the impact they can have.  As 
Phillips et al. point out, this is a unique case where managerial discretion may influence 
the stakeholder orientation while, at the same time, stakeholders themselves are 
influencing the amount of managerial discretion available.  Several propositions are 
offered for the relationship between amount of managerial discretion (high vs. low) and 
stakeholder orientation (narrow vs. broad) with respect to stakeholder performance.  
These propositions also take into account how these relationships might change over 
time.  The greatest amount of value across all stakeholders is proposed to result from a 
broad orientation among managers with higher discretion.  This same combination (broad 
orientation, high discretion environment) is also proposed to lead to an increase in 
discretion over time. 
 
2.2.1 Determinants of Discretion 
Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) seminal work presented managerial discretion 
as the latitude of action a top manager has.  Two facets of managerial discretion were 
identified.  The first facet is that which is determined by the manager through their 
cognitive bases, political ability, and other characteristics.  On the other hand, the context 
in which the manager operates will also impact discretion through what is considered 
acceptable by powerful stakeholders.  These limitations will be enforced by the possible 
loss of influence by the manager.  While these are two facets of managerial discretion, 
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three determinants of the amount of discretion available have been identified: managerial, 
organization, and environmental characteristics.  Hambrick and Finkelstein also outline 
the two extremes on the managerial discretion continuum; the titular figurehead (all three 
determinants limit discretion) and the unconstrained manager (all three determinants give 
the manager discretion).  Overall, they sum up managerial discretion by saying “a chief 
executive who is aware of multiple courses of action that lie within the zone of 
acceptance of powerful parties is said to have discretion” and noting that future research 
will depend upon effectively measuring such discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987: 
378). 
Managerial activities were proposed as a fourth determinant of managerial 
discretion by Finkelstein and Peteraf (2007).  They defined activities as “a discrete 
managerial function or task, involving a course of action that could be configured in a 
variety of ways” (Finkelstein and Peteraf, 2007:239).  Three characteristics, based on 
agency theory and transaction costs, were proposed as determining how the activities 
would affect discretion: degree of complexity, observability, and uncertainty.  Finkelstein 
and Peteraf posit that activities higher in each of these characteristics will allow for 
greater discretion.  They also suggest that managers with high levels of discretion are 
then free to choose between a variety of activities, both those requiring high discretion 
and those requiring low discretion. 
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2.2.2 Assessing Managerial Discretion 
The challenge of assessing managerial discretion was undertaken by Hambrick 
and Abrahamson (1995).  The focus was on the seven factors in an industry, suggested by 
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), which would impact managerial discretion: outside 
forces, quasi-legal constraints, demand instability, market growth, industry structure, 
product differentiability, and capital intensity.  The method used for developing a valid 
measure of managerial discretion as impacted by industry factors was to obtain ratings of 
industries from a panel of academics in Strategy and Organizational Theory and compare 
their responses to those of a panel of security analysts.  These ratings were then compared 
with industry averages where appropriate to determine the correlation between the two 
approaches.  Differentiability, capital intensity, and market growth showed a high 
correlation among the different ratings.  Overall, Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) 
suggest that it is possible to develop effective measures of managerial discretion. 
 These industry factors were also the focus of another study by Abrahamson and 
Hambrick (1997) linking managerial discretion to the homogeneity of attention patterns 
in an industry.  They hypothesized that the latitude provided by greater discretion would 
lead to more heterogeneous attention patterns among managers in the same industry.  The 
study made use of the industry measures discussed in the previous Hambrick and 
Abrahamson research to classify the discretion in the industry and the common use of 
words in shareholder letters to measure attentional homogeneity.  Through the use of 
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these methods, it was determined that there is greater attentional homogeneity in 
industries with less managerial discretion. 
 Keegan and Kabanoff (2008) sought to expand on and extend Abrahamson and 
Hambrick’s (1997) work on attentional homogeneity and industry-level discretion.  They 
used a similar method in that they examined the use of words in public communications.  
Keegan and Kabanoff hypothesized that industry-level discretion would have a negative 
relationship with the use of debt in an industry and that additional discretion would 
provide the freedom to make accounting changes more often.  Both hypotheses were 
supported, with the first hypothesis displaying a nonlinear relationship.  Their results also 
suggested that deviation from industry average on certain characteristics (debt, in this 
case) can decrease managerial discretion.   
 Aspects of managerial discretion in addition to those mentioned above were 
developed by Shen and Cho (2005) in their work on involuntary executive turnover.  
They sought to consider both the economic and managerial approaches to discretion, 
identifying the additional aspects of latitude of objectives and latitude of actions.  
Latitude of actions focuses on the Hambrick and Finkelstein definition of discretion 
through examination of the range of strategic options that are available to managers in 
their pursuit of desirable outcomes.  The economic approach is represented by latitude of 
objectives, the amount of freedom that top management has to pursue their own goals.  
Both approaches consider corporate control and address similar antecedents such as 
organization form (Finkelstein & Peteraf, 2007).  Finkelstein and Peteraf suggest that the 
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focus on opportunism in the economic perspective has led to the lack of work attempting 
to integrate the two approaches and that the two perspectives have much to offer each 
other.  While Hambrick and Finkelstein offer no empirical test of the relationship 
between these two approaches to discretion and involuntary turnover, several 
propositions are developed.  Some of these propositions include lower-level executives 
being more likely to face involuntary turnover when both aspects of discretion are present 
and that poor performance will be the cause of involuntary turnover when both aspects 
are absent.   
 A theoretical work by Offstein et al. (2007) considered the limits on the discretion 
of top management teams.  Interestingly, their work does not specifically address or build 
on the prior stream started by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), drawing mainly on 
leadership literature and specifically House and Aditya’s (1997) leadership effect.  This 
effect is proposed to be highest when top management has higher discretion both within 
the firm and in the environment with regards to making decisions and implementing the 
chosen action.  They develop propositions regarding a number of organization and 
environmental variables that could influence discretion.  Some of the internal variables 
include the level of support the top management team members have when they assume 
their positions and how the prior management team performed and was viewed by 
members of the organization.  The level of competition (or hypercompetition) and the 
labor market for executives are two of the external factors considered. 
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 One of the first empirical tests of managerial discretion was undertaken by 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990).  Their goal was to identify how managerial discretion 
may moderate the effect of top management characteristics on organization outcomes 
within an Upper Echelon perspective, an approach that has been common in the 
literature.  In order to do so, their research hypothesized and then tested that top 
management tenure would be more closely related to organization performance and 
strategies in high discretion organizations and industries in comparison to low discretion 
situations.  Their sample of 100 firms came from low-, medium-, and high-discretion 
industries and the overall results included findings such as long-tenured management 
teams being associated with persistence in strategies.  In regards to the moderating role of 
discretion, the inclusion of discretion in their models accounted for additional variance in 
all cases.  As expected, top management characteristics were more strongly related to 
outcomes in industries that provided greater discretion.  This pattern also held at another 
level of analysis, that of discretion within the organization.  It is also interesting to note 
that CEOs were, not unsurprisingly, more committed to keeping the leadership of the 
organization consistent than to maintaining the current strategy. 
 Hambrick et al. (1993) examined a similar outcome, commitment to the status quo 
in place of strategic persistence, while also utilizing managerial discretion as a moderator.  
They defined commitment to the status quo as “a belief in the enduring correctness of 
current organization strategies and profiles” and hypothesized that factors such as 
industry tenure and organization tenure would be positively related to their commitment, 
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moderated by the discretion associated with the industry (Hambrick et al., 1993:402).  
Industry tenure of CEOs was found to have the most significant impact on commitment 
to the status quo.  The relationship was moderated by managerial discretion as 
hypothesized, with industry tenure being a stronger predictor for commitment to the 
strategy in the high-discretion industry when compared to the low-discretion industry. 
 Managerial discretion as a moderator was the approach taken by Magnan and St-
Onge (1997) as well.  Their study sampled large commercial banks in the United States 
over a four year period.  The contingency of executive compensation with regards to 
organization performance was the relationship suggested to be moderated by managerial 
discretion.  High discretion was expected to lead compensation to be more dependent 
upon firm performance in contrast to low discretion situations.  When performance was 
measured by return on assets and stock price, this contingency is moderated by the 
amount of managerial discretion, suggesting that boards of directors take this relationship 
into account when making compensation decisions.  Interviews conducted by St-Onge et 
al. (2001) present that executives themselves also identify the relationship between 
discretion and compensation, noting that stock ownership programs are more effective for 
managers that have the discretion to actually impact the price of that stock.   
 Environmental commitment was the dependent variable considered by Aragon-
Correa et al. (2004) in their study of managerial discretion.  In their study, they wanted to 
compare the managerial view to the inertial view in the context of the organization’s 
actions in regard to environmental responsibility.  For managerial discretion, the focus 
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was on the additional latitude that was suggested to come from being a member of the 
dominant coalition within the organization.  When discretion was measured in this way, 
organizations with someone in the dominant coalition responsible for environmental 
matters displayed greater environmental commitment.  Their findings also add to the 
literature supporting the position that top managers do influence the actions of their 
organizations.   
 The concentration of ownership from an agency theory and corporate governance 
approach was examined by Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) as one of the outside forces 
that would limit discretion.  In their work, they considered how concentration of 
ownership would constrain managerial discretion and what the performance implications 
of this were for the organization.  The underlying theory was that higher ownership 
concentration reduces the governance costs involved in creating a majority coalition 
among ownership that can then be better suited to addressing agency issues.  Their 
hypotheses were tested across five countries to consider how the differences in corporate 
governance in these countries would affect the relationships.  This allowed the authors to 
address how the institutional features of varying countries impact discretion.  Several 
important findings are suggested by their results.  First, managerial discretion in the 
United States seems to be targeted at discouraging the padding of costs by managers 
rather than preventing strategizing in their own self-interest, in this case excessive 
diversification.  Another result from this study was additional support for the varying 
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dimensions that can impact discretion given that the institutional context and ownership 
concentration both influenced discretion.   
 
2.2.3 Impact of CEOs with Discretion 
What can CEOs with discretion impact within the organization was a question 
addressed by Peterson et al. (2003).  This study considered discretion in terms of what 
influence a CEO’s personality will have on the TMT interactions within their 
organization.  They utilized the Five-Factor personality model and hypothesized how 
these personality traits of the CEO would influence various group processes among the 
TMT.  Their results provide strong support overall for the discretion managers have to 
influence aspects of their organization.  Some specific relationships identified by their 
results include CEO emotional stability positively influencing team cohesion and 
openness positively influencing team risk-taking. 
 Another area that managers with discretion can impact is that of strategic renewal 
via internal or external methods (Sahaym & Steensma, 2007).  The amount of managerial 
discretion available in an industry will affect a number of relationships with regards to 
strategic renewal.  Sahaym and Steensma (2007), in their study of manufacturing firms, 
found higher levels of managerial discretion to be positively associated with both internal 
and external approaches to strategic renewal.  Managerial discretion also moderated the 
relationship of technological change positively impacting strategic renewal, with the 
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relationship being stronger in instances of greater managerial discretion.  A similar 
outcome resulted from an analysis of industry standards and strategic renewal.   
 Top managers other than the CEO were the sample for a study by Preston, Chen, 
and Leidner (2008), which chose to focus on the discretion of the CIO of organizations.  
They developed several possible antecedents to the amount of decision-making authority 
that CIOs would have including organization support for IT and the organization climate.  
Utilizing managerial discretion as a foundation, they then hypothesized that the amount 
of CIO authority would determine the contribution of IT to firm performance.  This 
hypothesis was supported by the results of the study.  They also found that top 
management support of IT and organization climate would positively influence the 
amount of authority the CIOs have. 
 Managerial discretion was also the foundation of work by Quigley and Hambrick 
(2009) seeking to explain how a former CEO remaining with the organization as the 
chairman of the board can affect the organization following a CEO succession.  Their 
discussion leads to the hypothesis that the CEO remaining as chairman of the board will 
be negatively associated with strategic change and variations in firm performance 
following a succession event.  Overall, their hypotheses were supported.  The retention of 
the prior CEO was negatively associated with a number of variables including changes in 
the top management team and reallocation of strategic resources.  The previous CEO 
remaining as chairman also reduced the amount of variation in performance following 
succession.  Finally, the results provide a test of and support the aforementioned impact 
42 
 
that powerful parties can have through their “zone of acceptance”, the prior CEO in this 
case.  
 Overall, the literature regarding Upper Echelon Theory and managerial discretion 
supports the influence a CEO or top management can have on their organizations when 
provided the discretion to do so.  This takes place through a number of different 
processes, such as determining the strategic core of the organization and identifying what 
issues will receive attention in the strategy process (Noel, 1989).  As this review shows, 
one area that has received little attention in the literature is the impact of the personality 
of CEOs.  This study seeks to address this by examining the aggressiveness of CEOs. 
 
2.3 Competitive Aggressiveness 
 Competitive dynamics has been defined by Smith, Ferrier, and Ndofor (2001:315) 
as “a series of actions (moves) and reactions (countermoves) among firms in an 
industry”.  Within this diverse stream of research that addresses a variety of interrelated 
areas including competitive responses, multi-market competition, and the impact of a 
firm’s prior performance, we also find work on competitive aggressiveness (Smith et al., 
2001).  Given the very diverse nature of the area, this portion of the literature review will 
focus primarily on the stream of research directly related to the term competitive 
aggressiveness, although it is important to note that many researchers in the area draw on  
related topics in the competitive dynamics literature for additional support in their 
research (i.e. Ferrier, 2001).   
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2.3.1 Development of Competitive Aggressiveness 
Competitive aggressiveness has recently been noted as an underdeveloped area 
(Stambaugh et al., 2009).  One of the earliest uses of the term was by Covin and Covin 
(1990) in their study regarding the performance of small firms.  Their development of 
competitive aggressiveness cited work ranging from Porter’s offensive strategies (1985) 
to Lambkin’s (1988) entry order effects.   Covin and Covin (1990:36) considered firms 
pursuing an aggressive competitive approach to be those who “initiate actions to which 
competitors then respond; are often first to introduce new products, administrative 
techniques, operating technologies, etc.; and typically adopt a very competitive, ‘undo-
the competitors’ posture.”  Among the small firms in their sample, successful firms were 
more likely to initiate competitive interactions than their poorer performing counterparts.  
The results of the study also suggest that a more aggressive competitive posture has a 
positive impact for small firms of at least 30 employees.  The authors also present the 
importance of managers in small firms pursuing the appropriate level of competitive 
aggressiveness as suggested by the technological sophistication and hostility present in 
the environment.   
The discussion of competitive aggressiveness in small firms also fits well with its 
inclusion in work by Lumpkin and Dess (1996) on entrepreneurial orientation, although 
this is not to suggest that entrepreneurial orientation is applicable to only small firms.  
Their focus is on new entry into markets, regardless of the type of firm or method 
employed.  To coincide with this new entry, firms often need to display competitive 
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aggressiveness as they deal with the existing firms in the market.  They also propose that 
competitive aggressiveness includes the willingness to take unconventional approaches to 
competition as part of an entrepreneurial orientation.  However, they did not provide 
empirical tests of their propositions.   
Dean et al. (1993) did empirically test competitive aggressiveness in regard to 
entrepreneurship within the context of corporations.  This research included a number of 
variables in addition to competitive aggressiveness including differentiation and initial 
success.  Interestingly, in a sample that included companies from a wide range of 
countries, competitive aggressiveness was the common thread with regard to corporate 
entrepreneurship.  Across all of the different groupings of companies in the sample, 
competitive aggressiveness had the highest or second highest correlation with corporate 
entrepreneurship among all of the independent variables.   
 
2.3.2 Dimensions of Competitive Aggressiveness 
In another approach to examining competitive aggressiveness, the construct was 
proposed to consist of four dimensions: volume, duration, complexity, and 
unpredictability of competitive attacks (Ferrier, 2001).  Ferrier drew on work such as 
Kirzner’s firm rivalry (1973) and Schumpeter’s (1950) creative destruction when 
developing this four-dimension view of competitive aggressiveness.  Ferrier sought to 
examine how patterns develop in competitive interactions and how these patterns will 
affect the performance of the organizations involved.  Past firm performance, TMT 
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heterogeneity, organization slack, and the type of competition faced were all 
hypothesized to impact each of the four dimensions of competitive aggressiveness in 
different ways.  All four dimensions were also hypothesized to be positively related to 
firm performance.  Some of the important pertinent conclusions included a relationship 
between some of the dimensions of competitive aggressiveness and top management 
heterogeneity, slack, and industry characteristics.  As for performance, greater attack 
volume and longer duration of the attacks were associated with an increase in market 
share.   
Three sub-dimensions of competitive aggressiveness were proposed by 
Stambaugh et al. (2009): outperform motivation, action capability, and rival awareness.  
Their stance is that all three of these dimensions will lead to greater competitive 
aggressiveness and that this increased aggressiveness will be related to improved 
financial performance.  They also suggest that competitive aggressiveness will result in 
additional competitive actions; a point that is echoed by studies discussed later that utilize 
number of competitive moves as a proxy for aggressiveness.  Their hypothesis that 
competitive aggressiveness would be positively associated with performance was 
supported in regards to market share.  However, the relationship was not significant when 
profitability, ROA, and ROE were utilized as the dependent variable.  Market density did 
moderate the relationship, with competitive aggressiveness being positively related to 
profitability in metropolitan areas.   
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2.3.3 Factors Influencing Competitive Aggressiveness 
The factors that may influence competitive aggressiveness have received some 
attention in the literature.  One such factor has been that of mutual forbearance and 
multimarket contact.  It is suggested in the literature that firms competing in several of 
the same markets as their rivals will compete with less intensity due to the greater 
possibility of retaliation (Chen, 1996).  However, retaliation is also more likely in such 
situations.  To empirically examine the hypothesis that greater multi-market contact 
would be associated with less competitive aggressiveness, Yu and Subramaniam (2005) 
utilized structural content analysis of competitive actions in the automobile industry.  
Their findings supported this hypothesis, showing lower levels of competitive 
aggressiveness in situations of greater multi-market contact.  The amount of ownership 
that parent corporations had with regards to subsidiaries was also found to be a 
moderator, with greater ownership leading to a greater effect of multi-market contact.  
The study also considered the impact of the multinational nature of automobile 
companies, finding greater cultural distance across markets lessened the impact of multi-
market competition and greater constraints in host markets increased the impact of multi-
market contact.   
Similar results were obtained by Young et al. (2000), who examined the 
frequency and speed of competitive moves towards rivals, hypothesizing that greater 
multimarket contact would result in fewer actions, but that the actions that did occur 
would happen more quickly.  Both of these relationships were supported by the results.  
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Thus, multimarket contact can reduce competitive aggressiveness, but, can also lead to an 
increased need to signal competitive intentions to other firms, a topic that will be 
discussed later.  These findings suggest important contingencies that can influence the 
development of competitive aggressiveness. 
 Yu and Canella, Jr. (2005) also studied the impact of country and market 
variations on competitive aggressiveness.  They concentrated on the characteristics of the 
country (i.e. government power and constraints) and the firm (i.e. degree of control and 
amount of multi-market contact) and how these would influence competitive 
aggressiveness.  Once again, the sample was from the automotive industry.  In this case, 
competitive aggressiveness was measured by the variety of competitive actions and the 
number of actions undertaken.  This study found that government constraints are 
associated with lower levels of competitive aggression for foreign-based companies and 
higher levels of competitive aggression for companies in their home market.  As for the 
firm characteristics, multi-market contact was associated with lower levels of competitive 
aggressiveness, as was the amount of control the firm has over its subsidiaries.   
 Another firm characteristic that has been posited to affect competitive 
aggressiveness is capital structure.  Utilizing a sample from the airline industry, Zhang 
(2005) sought to identify the relationships between how a firm is financed and the 
competitive actions undertaken.  Zhang hypothesized that greater equity and lower 
earnings pressure would lead to more aggressive competitive behavior.  Cash flow and 
equity were also moderators for the impact earnings pressure would have, with higher 
48 
 
levels of either leading to less of an impact.  All of the aforementioned hypotheses were 
supported by the results of the study. 
 While the study focused on only one organization, work by Gresov et al. (1993) 
provided valuable insights into how organization design, environmental pressures, and 
inertia can influence competitive aggressiveness, specifically in regards to competitive 
responses.  Their work provides a potential approach for modeling responses based on 
catastrophe models.  One observation they made based on the research was that two 
organizations facing the same environmental pressures and organization inertia may 
respond with different levels of aggressiveness.  Another important observation was that 
when aggressive organizations face less inertia they are more likely to become less 
aggressive, while the opposite applies to less aggressive organizations.   
Competitive responses and aggressiveness were one of the areas Smith et al. 
(1992) considered in their research, in this case focusing on how the reputation of 
organizations as being aggressive (in terms of cutting prices) would impact the imitators 
of actions, the speed of response to their actions, and the number of reactions that would 
result.  They found the reputation for being aggressive in regards to pricing was 
associated with faster responses to competitive actions from rivals.  A reputation for 
aggressiveness also resulted in less imitation by competitors.  The number of firms 
reacting to an action overall was not associated with a prior reputation for aggressiveness. 
Competitive aggressiveness has previously been studied in conjunction with 
Upper Echelons as well.  The prior study taking this approach that is most closely related 
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to the current research is that of Lin (2006).  Lin’s study brought together research on 
competitive dynamics and Upper Echelons to examine competitive advantages.  This 
study considered the relationship between top management team characteristics, the 
aggressiveness of the organization, and firm performance.  Top management 
characteristics (CEO power dominance) were related to two types of firm aggressiveness 
(action and response) and firm performance.   
 
2.3.4 Competitive Aggressiveness as an Independent Variable 
Competitive aggressiveness has also been studied as an independent variable.  For 
example, the competitive aggressiveness of incumbent firms has been found to deter 
entry into a new market (Clark & Montgomery, 1998).  Clark and Montgomery (1998) 
hypothesized that incumbents who were viewed as aggressive would cause a potential 
entrant to consider the market unattractive and risky.  In keeping with the aforementioned 
findings on mutual forebearance, this relationship was expected to be stronger in cases 
with greater multimarket contact.  Among the sample of students, all of the above 
relationships received support.   
Hsieh and Vermeulen (2008) also considered the impact of competitive 
aggressiveness on market entry.  Their addition to the literature was to consider possible 
market entry as a result of following a competitor.  Hsieh and Vermeulen considered that 
a larger number of competitors entering the market, greater multimarket contact, 
identifying with a strategic group, and less competitive aggressiveness by competitors 
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would all lead to a greater likelihood of following a competitor’s entry into a new market.  
All four of these hypotheses were supported by the results of the study.   
 Another result of competitive aggressiveness that has received attention in the 
literature is output quantity.  Drawing on work by Amit et al. (1988) that considered the 
reputations of competitors in terms of how aggressively they would respond to 
competitive moves (i.e. changes in production or price), Mas-Ruiz et al. (2005) studied 
the Spanish banking industry to determine how perceptions of aggressiveness across 
strategic groups would influence the quantity of output, in this case deposit quantities.  
Mas-Ruiz et al. found that the results were in line with work by Reger and Huff (1993), 
in that strategic groups of small companies will respond more aggressively to the 
competitive actions of larger companies because they subscribe greater importance to 
these actions.  On the other hand, larger companies will respond less aggressively to the 
moves of smaller competitors.  Mas-Ruiz et al. also state that these findings suggest the 
size of a competitor as one factor that can assist in determining what their reaction will be 
to a competitive move.   
 How such moves will be interpreted as competitive signals was the focus of 
Prabhu and Stewart’s (2001) study using a computer simulation game with upper-level 
undergraduate and MBA students.  Consistent with attribution theory, competitors whose 
moves were the result of internal factors were seen as more competitive than those whose 
moves were the result of external factors.  Senders of signals who faced external factors 
were not perceived differently with regards to competitiveness, regardless of the strength 
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of the competitive signal.  The aggressiveness of senders was also perceived differently 
with regards to bluffing and the cost of information.  Finally, bluffs and costs of 
information also affected how aggressive the respondents were when asked if they would 
enter the sender’s market.  Heil and Walters (1993) also considered signaling, but in the 
context of actual firms.  Their primary finding was a supported positive relationship 
between the hostility of the signal perceived in a product introduction and the strength of 
the competitive reaction, with greater hostility provoking a stronger response.  A similar 
relationship was found for how much of an impact the competitor thought the other 
firm’s new product would have on their own organization.  These findings suggest that 
the reaction to and perception of competitive aggressiveness will be interpreted 
differently depending on the context, possibly affecting how aggressive the response to 
such moves are.   
   Offstein and Gnyawali (2005) drew on aggressiveness literature to develop their 
hypotheses on how short- and long-term CEO compensation would impact the 
competitive moves of pharmaceutical companies.  Their focus on competitive activity 
was mainly in regards to the number of competitive moves, which has been shown to be 
positively associated with firm performance (Young et al., 1996).  The results of the 
study did show a relationship between CEO compensation and the competitive moves of 
organizations.  Short-term CEO bonuses were related to the number of competitive 
moves undertaken by their respective organizations.  They also found long-term 
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compensation to be related to competitive moves, but not to the same extent as short-term 
compensation. 
 Vroom (2006) took compensation packages combined with organization structure 
to examine the effects on competitive aggressiveness.  Vroom’s concern was that these 
two variables had previously only been studied in isolation so a model and simulation 
was developed to examine the combination of the two.  The model suggests that firms 
come to a mutually detrimental outcome from increased aggressive behavior because 
both organizations will change their organization structure at the same time, resulting in 
decreased profits.  Overall, the model also suggests that structure of the organization has 
a greater impact on aggressiveness than does the compensation system of top 
management. 
Competitive aggressiveness is also found in the practitioner literature.  One such 
example is that of Stalk and Lachenauer (2004), who discussed the importance of what 
they called “playing hardball” with the competition, analogous to being competitively 
aggressive.  Their suggestion is that organizations should be willing to “play rough and 
don’t apologize for it” in regards to the competition (Stalk and Lachenauer, 2004:63).  
They cite several examples of organizations that do so, such as Toyota, Southwest 
Airlines, and Wal-Mart.  Several of their suggestions for being aggressive line up well 
with approaches discussed in the academic literature, including smartly attacking 
competitors in indirect ways and destroying what they called profit sanctuaries, those 
areas where competitors make the greatest profits.   
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As can be seen from the literature reviewed here, a number of antecedents and 
outcomes related to competitive aggressiveness have been examined.  However, none 
have examined the aggressiveness of the CEO in conjunction with the competitive 
aggressiveness of their organization and the impact on performance.  This study seeks to 
extend the literature by combining Upper Echelon Theory with competitive 
aggressiveness to examine these relationships.  The following section outlines the 
hypothesized relationships between these variables.   
 
2.4 Hypotheses 
 Based on prior research, several hypotheses were developed in regards to the 
expected relationships between organization performance, CEO aggressiveness, and 
competitive aggressiveness of the organization.  Those hypotheses are noted in the 
research model presented below, Figure 2.1.  The model is followed by the four 
hypotheses and supporting literature. 
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Figure 2.1 Research Model with Hypotheses 
 
2.4.1 CEO Aggressiveness and Organization Aggressiveness 
 In the initial article outlining Upper Echelon Theory, Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
stated, even in the title, that organizations will be a reflection of their top managers.  
They suggested that this impact of top management will include not only the performance 
of the organization, but also the strategies the organization will pursue.  While Hambrick 
and Mason focused on demographic characteristics of top management, psychological 
characteristics were also discussed as influencing organization outcomes.  Another aspect 
that is specifically mentioned is an individual valuing alternatives and consequences 
differently.  Selective perception of events occurring in the environment will also impact 
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how a top manager guides the organization.  It is suggested here that if this top manager 
is more aggressive, they may be more likely to remember the aggressive actions of 
competitors and interpret actions as aggressive.  They may also value aggressive 
alternatives more highly, leading to a greater likelihood of the organization pursuing 
aggressive strategies.  In addition, the characteristics of top managers have generally been 
supported in the literature as having an impact on the competitive actions that an 
organization will pursue (Smith et al., 2001). 
 While empirical research examining the impact of CEO personality and traits 
outside of demographic variables is somewhat rare, the research that has been done is 
promising and suggests that CEO aggressiveness will impact the organization’s strategy.  
Peterson et al. (2003) considered the impact of CEO personality on the organization as 
one process through which leadership influences organization performance.  They 
examined the personality of CEOs using the five factor model (agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness) and hypothesized an impact 
on organization performance through the influence that CEO personality would have on 
top management team dynamics.  Several of these factors of personality were related to 
the functioning of the top management team.  Examples include relationships for CEO 
agreeableness with top management team cohesion and CEO openness with top 
management team intellectual flexibility.  Furthermore, these characteristics of the top 
management team (such as optimism and flexibility) were positively associated with the 
measure of organization performance (income growth).  Narcissism and core self-
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evaluations are additional CEO personality characteristics that have also been found to 
impact organization outcomes through their influence on leadership styles (Resick, 
Weingarden, Whitman, & Hiller, 2009).  On the whole, this research suggests that the 
personality of CEOs can affect the outcomes of their organizations through an influence 
on specific areas of the organization.   
 CEO personal characteristics such as attitudes have also been proposed to impact 
their organizations.  Lewin and Stephens (1994) presented numerous propositions based 
on prior research in regards to how CEO attitudes such as tolerance for ambiguity, risk 
propensity, and egalitarianism would influence the design of their organizations.  In 
addition, research by Smith et al. (1991) showed less experienced management teams to 
be more likely to behave aggressively based on how likely their firms were to respond to 
competitive actions.  A relationship between CEO characteristics such as education, 
tenure, and functional background and two of the four strategies from the Miles and 
Snow typology (1978) has also been found (Thomas & Ramaswamy, 1989; Thomas, 
Litschert, & Ramaswamy, 1991; Thomas & Ramaswamy, 1996).   
Aggressiveness of CEOs was specifically mentioned by Miller et al. (1982) in 
their discussion of the impact of personality on organization strategies and structures, 
even though their chosen personality characteristic for study was locus of control.  Not 
only did their findings identify a relationship between this personality variable and 
strategy outcomes such as risk taking, proactiveness, and innovation, but this relationship 
was strongest when considering the top executive in the organization rather than the 
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entire senior management team.  In addition, proactiveness was defined in the study as 
pursuing strategies that were out in front of the competition, suggesting a more 
aggressive approach.  Offstein and Gnyawali (2005) did specifically consider how 
differences among CEOs could impact the aggressiveness of their firms.  While the 
difference among CEOs that they considered was the pay and incentive structure, their 
results do show that some portion of the variance in competitive aggressiveness among 
firms can be associated with differences among their CEOs.   
 CEO personality has also been found to be associated with the specific strategies 
being pursued.  Miller and Toulouse (1986) discovered a number of relationships 
between the strategies of organizations and CEO flexibility, need for achievement, and 
locus of control.  Most applicable to the discussion here is that CEO need for 
achievement was associated with greater strategic aggressiveness for their organizations, 
which seems to imply that CEOs who display such personality characteristics may desire 
to aggressively pursue such goals, resulting in more aggressive actions by their 
organizations.  Miller and Toulouse suggest that these CEOs will pursue such strategies 
to satisfy a need to expand and build market share.  It should be noted, however, that the 
sample consisted of primarily smaller organizations (the mean number of employees was 
382).   
 Need for achievement was also utilized by Miller and Droge (1986) and was the 
CEO personality variable most associated with outcomes in another example of how 
CEO personality impacts the structure of their organizations.  They hypothesized that 
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those CEOs high in need for achievement would be more likely to have organizations 
high in centralization, formalization, and integration in order to provide the control and 
feedback they desire.  This was the case as need for achievement was associated with all 
three structure variables.  Once again, while this was the case in the overall sample, the 
effect is strongest among smaller organizations.  These studies by Miller and colleagues 
provide evidence of a linkage between the personality of an organization’s CEO and the 
strategies that the organization will be more likely to pursue.    
 Lin (2006) indirectly tied CEO characteristics into the aggressiveness of their 
organizations.  Lin’s research proposed that CEO power dominance would have a 
negative relationship with top management team social integration and that TMT social 
integration would then display a positive relationship with competitive aggressiveness.  
However, when the direct effects were considered, CEO power dominance displayed a 
negative relationship with both action and response aggressiveness for the organization.  
Power dominance as defined by Lin was the degree of influence other top managers had 
in regard to important decisions made by the CEO.  While not necessarily a personal 
characteristic of the CEO, these results provide an instance in which variables related to 
the CEO were associated with a change in the aggressiveness of their organizations’ 
actions.   
 While there has been almost no work done in regards to how the aggressiveness 
of the CEO impacts the organization, the above studies all provide support for the impact 
that CEOs and top management can have on their organizations based on their personal 
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characteristics.  Given the variety of CEO characteristics previously studied in this 
relationship, it seems logical to assume that CEO aggressiveness would also be capable 
of producing a similar effect within organizations.  As noted by Hambrick and Mason 
(1984), organizations will tend to be reflections of their top managers, suggesting that 
aggressive CEOs will tend to lead more aggressive organizations.  Based on this and the 
preceding research cited above, the following hypothesis is presented: 
 H1: The competitive aggressiveness of an organization will be positively 
associated with the aggressiveness of its CEO. 
 
2.4.2 Organization Aggressiveness and Organization Performance 
 The second hypothesis considers how the aggressiveness of the competitive 
behaviors of organizations impacts performance.  Considerable work exists in the 
literature pertaining to this relationship, providing a good foundation for hypothesizing 
the expected outcome.  Ferrier et al. (1999) provide insight into this relationship by 
suggesting quicker competitive responses and a greater quantity of competitive moves 
were consistent with a more aggressive organization among industry leaders.  In regards 
to both the number of competitive moves and the timing of responses, being more 
aggressive was associated with market leaders who performed better, maintaining their 
position as leader and their market share relative to challengers.  This can also be tied to 
profitability, as greater market share has been shown to have a positive relationship with 
profitability (Szymanski, Bharadwaj, & Varadarajan, 1993).   
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 The approach to competitive aggressiveness utilizing three facets (rival 
awareness, outperform motivation, and action capability) discussed earlier has also been 
associated with market share performance (Stambaugh, Lumpkin, Brigham, & Cogliser, 
2009).  Those firms that displayed a higher level of competitive aggressiveness tended to 
show gains in market share, in this case, for both loans and deposits, as the sample 
consisted of banks.  Profitability was also positively affected by competitive 
aggressiveness for those banks in metropolitan areas.  
 Competitive aggressiveness has also been shown to impact stock market returns 
for organizations.  Ferrier and Hun (2002) stated that the main finding from their study 
was that organizations will outperform their competitors by initiating and sustaining 
sequences of aggressive competitive moves.  They also suggest this relationship will hold 
above and beyond industry growth and economic conditions.   
 An important distinction applicable to this research is made by Young, Smith, and 
Grimm (1996) when they examine the differences in competitive behaviors across levels, 
as what can increase performance for an individual organization can lead to a decrease in 
performance when applied to the entire industry.  They hypothesize, and their results 
support, that higher levels of competition at an industry level (i.e. industry rivalry) will be 
associated with lower levels of firm performance.  On the other hand, higher levels of 
competitive activity for a single firm, which was utilized in several of the studies above 
as a sign of competitive aggressiveness, are associated with higher levels of firm 
performance.  Similar results were obtained by Smith et al. (1991), who considered the 
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likelihood of competitive responses and the impact on profitability.  Another important 
finding of Young et al. (1996) is that the increased aggressiveness by the organization 
seems to lead to positive performance implications for the individual firm that prevail 
over the negative consequences of increased industry rivalry.   
 As mentioned earlier, being the first to introduce a product is often considered to 
be a sign of competitive aggressiveness (Covin et al., 1990), making the implications for 
performance from the benefits of being the first mover an important consideration for the 
impact of competitive aggressiveness (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988).  Several studies 
have supported the positive performance implications of being an early mover.  Lee et al. 
(2000) found that first and second movers achieved higher abnormal profits from their 
position as early mover and that this effect was greater the faster the product was 
introduced, i.e. being more aggressive.  It is noted that this effect can be negatively 
impacted by rapid imitation.  However, more aggressive firms may increase the time 
before imitation occurs by acting sooner, allowing them to enjoy the performance 
benefits for a longer period of time.   
 Lambkin’s (1988) research also supported the performance benefits of being a 
first mover in a market, although fast followers did not fare as well in this sample.  Being 
the first was associated with greater market share, higher return on sales, and higher ROI, 
although it took some time for these benefits to outweigh the expenses associated with 
being a first mover.  In addition, other variables that could be construed as a display of 
more competitive aggressiveness (Lambkin utilizes the term intensity), such as the scale 
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of the market entry and marketing expenditures, were also included in the analysis.  
These variables were also generally found to be associated with greater market share, 
more so than order of entry in most cases.  Based on prior research in the area, it is 
expected that firms that take a more competitive stance will display better performance.   
 H2: Organization performance will be positively associated with an 
organization’s competitive aggressiveness. 
 
2.4.3 CEO Aggressiveness, Organization Aggressiveness, and Organization Performance 
 If it is hypothesized that more aggressive CEOs will be associated with more 
aggressive organizations and that more aggressive organizations will perform better, then 
the interactions among these three variables are also important areas for study.  Following 
this path, can we assume aggressive CEOs will, through their impact on the 
aggressiveness of the organization, be associated with improved performance?  Can we 
assume the combination of aggressive CEOs and aggressive organizations will lead to 
better performance than situations in which the aggressiveness of the CEO and 
organization do not match?  Fortunately, past work in the literature provides some 
potential insights into these questions, leading to the development of the last two 
hypotheses.  In fact, discussion of this relationship within Upper Echelons Theory goes 
back to Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) original article, in which they note managers 
being selected because their background fits the actions the board hopes will be 
implemented.   
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Little work specifically tying the CEOs personal aggressiveness to the 
organization has been performed.  Due to this, the hypotheses developed here could be 
considered exploratory.  This also results in the support and development of the 
hypotheses focusing on similar relationships considering characteristics other than 
aggressiveness.  However, this approach is not unheard of when studying CEO 
characteristics and fit with strategy (Reed & Reed, 1989).  As noted earlier, CEOs have 
been shown to have an association with competitive aggressiveness in prior studies.  
Offstein and Gnyawali’s (2005) study, for example, found the type of CEO compensation 
was associated with competitive aggressiveness, which provides support for the 
proposition that differences among CEOs can impact the aggressiveness of their 
organizations.  As another example of top management in general impacting competitive 
aggressiveness, two aspects of competitive aggressiveness have been associated with the 
heterogeneity of the top management team (Offstein & Gnyawali, 2005) 
 Various studies have considered how the fit between manager and strategy will 
impact the organization and, in general, the dominant view is that there are performance 
benefits when the manager matches the strategy (Drazin & Van De Ven, 1985; Gupta, 
1986; Van Clieaf, 1992).  The majority of these studies utilize contingency theory as the 
basis for their discussion of fit between management and strategy (Drazin et al., 1985; 
Lawrence et al., 1967; Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985).  Gupta (1986) notes three 
underlying arguments for the importance of having managers and strategies that match: 
improved performance, differences in the skills and personalities that managers bring to 
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their positions, and the difference in the usefulness of skills across strategies.  For 
specific examples, consider the relationship between general managers and the difference 
when business units pursue a build versus a harvest strategy.  In this instance, business 
units pursuing a build strategy were more effective when led by a manager with more 
tolerance for ambiguity, more willingness to take risks, and more marketing experience 
(Gupta et al., 1984).  When managers with these characteristics lead a unit pursuing a 
harvest strategy, performance suffers.   
 Utilizing the Miles and Snow (1978) typology to identify general strategies, 
Thomas and Ramaswamy (1989) examined the fit of CEOs with their organizations’ 
strategies and how this influences performance.  Age and tenure of the CEOs were 
considered, along with ROA, ROS, and ROE for performance.  When the two CEO 
characteristics matched with the general strategy being pursued, organization 
performance was higher as measured by all three outcomes.  Thomas and colleagues 
expanded upon this research with several follow-up studies.  Thomas et al. (1991) 
considered the profile of CEOs of organizations pursuing Prospector and Defender 
strategies and studied the impact of the fit between the CEO profile and selected strategy.  
They found that organizations with CEOs who fit the Prospector profile performed better 
than organizations pursuing a Prospector strategy with a CEO that did not fit the profile.  
They did not find a significant relationship among organizations pursuing a Defender 
strategy, but attributed this to the characteristics of the industry in which the study was 
conducted (electronic computing equipment).  Thomas and Ramaswamy (1996) 
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continued this line of research by expanding the sample to three industries.  In this case, 
better performance was associated with CEO/strategy fit across both strategies and all 
three industries.  This study also provides support for the importance of this fit as it 
accounted for more of the variance in performance than industry, size of the organization, 
or age of the organization. 
 Appropriate fit between the choice of manager and strategy has also been found to 
impact performance in regards to the diversification strategy pursued by organizations 
(Reed et al., 1989).  This is probably the most popular strategic variable studied in the 
literature in regards to the fit between CEOs and their organization’s strategies.  Support 
for this relationship was found when considering the prior experience of the CEO with 
the diversification strategy being pursued by their current organization (Reed et al., 
1989).  In other words, an organization whose diversification strategy fit with the prior 
experience of its CEO performed better than those that lacked fit.   
 As to how the CEO impact on the organization will affect performance, we must 
turn to different CEO characteristics that have been studied to guide the research.  Gupta 
(1984) considered the characteristics of general managers and their organizations being 
vertically integrated or unrelated diversified, providing several propositions as to how 
characteristics such as attitude towards risk and prior experience would impact 
performance in a number of situations.  While no empirical tests were provided, Gupta 
suggests there are characteristics of top mangers that combine with the approach of the 
organization to impact organization performance.   
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In a different approach to the relationship, Herbert and Deresky (1987) 
interviewed the top management of a number of organizations and business units to 
determine the strategy pursued and how this fit with the attributes and skills of the 
general managers responsible for these units.  They propose that the attributes of the top 
manager will greatly influence the successful implementation of one of the four generic 
strategies developed in the research.  Most applicable to the discussion here is the 
identification of personal factors that can assist in the implementation of the identified 
strategy.  Aggressiveness is one such characteristic specifically identified and suggested 
as important when pursuing a strategy of market growth.  While there is no empirical 
examination of the performance relationship in their research, Herbert and Deresky also 
suggest, based on theirs and prior research, that the organization will benefit from a 
performance standpoint when there is a match between the manager and the strategy 
pursued.   
While their focus was on the top management team as a whole, the results of 
Marlin et al. (2004) related to strategy also provide support for the impact of top 
management fit with the strategy pursued.  They found a number of relationships between 
various characteristics of the top management team (i.e. homogeneity, tenure) and 
performance.  However, these performance relationships varied depending upon the 
approach to diversification being taken by the organization, suggesting that a match 
between top management and the strategy of the organization will be associated with 
improved performance.  Empirical evidence linking a CEO’s personal characteristics to 
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organization performance includes work such as that by Miller and Toulouse (1986).  In 
their study of the CEOs of smaller organizations, a number of CEO characteristics were 
associated with firm performance, most of them negatively.  Some of the characteristics 
that had a significant relationship included tenure with the organization, having an 
external locus of control, and being rigid.   
Based on the above research, it is proposed that aggressive CEOs will lead 
aggressive organizations, which has been shown to be associated with improved 
performance.  In keeping with prior work on the fit between CEOs and the strategies of 
their organizations, it is also proposed that a fit between aggressive CEOs and aggressive 
organizations will result in improved performance as well.  Thus, the following formal 
hypotheses are presented: 
 H3a: Organization performance will be positively associated with CEO 
aggressiveness. 
 H3b: Organization performance will be positively associated with the alignment 
between CEO characteristics and organization competitive aggressiveness (i.e. 
aggressive CEOs leading aggressive organizations). 
 
2.4.4 Summary of Hypotheses 
 The hypotheses presented above outline the expected relationships between the 
primary variables of interest in this study: CEO aggressiveness, organization 
aggressiveness, and organization performance.  It is expected, as presented by Upper 
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Echelon Theory, that the organizations studied will be reflections of their top manager, 
the CEO.  If this holds true, organizations led by aggressive CEOs should display a 
greater degree of competitive aggressiveness in their observed competitive moves.  In 
addition, there should be several implications for organization performance.  Research, as 
presented above, has shown that aggressive organizations tend to perform better than 
their less aggressive counterparts.  This, combined with the hypothesized relationship 
between CEO aggressiveness and organization competitive aggressiveness, suggests that 
the impact of having an aggressive CEO will be an improvement in organization 
performance through the influence on the competitive aggressiveness of the organization.  
Finally, as is suggested by the above literature and contingency theory, organizations who 
act with a higher level of competitive aggressiveness should perform better when an 
aggressive CEO is leading the organization.  The tests of these hypotheses will provide 
important insights into the relationship between CEO personal characteristics, the actions 
of their organizations, and the performance implications of both. 
 
2.4.5 Discussion of Control Variables 
 In addition to the variables represented by the relationships outlined in the 
hypotheses, several control variables are also posited to influence the relationships in this 
research.  These variables were all related to the CEO or the organizations involved.  The 
organization variables considered were age and size.  For the CEO’s, functional 
background and tenure are suggested to be important for the relationships studied here.   
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 The competitive aggressiveness of organizations has been shown to be influenced 
by the size of the organization (Lin, 2006).  In addition, size has been shown to be 
associated with the competitive behavior of organizations (Chen & Hambrick, 1995).  In 
addition to the size of organizations, the age of organizations is commonly included as a 
control variable in the literature (Smith et al., 2001).      
 While both CEO age and tenure are often utilized in Upper Echelons research, 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) found tenure to be a better predictor than age in 
general.  Henderson et al. (2006) found CEO tenure to have a non-linear relationship with 
organization performance.  As presented in the literature review, CEO background has 
been associated with a variety of organization outcomes, including CEOs through a 
variety of processes, such as how they perceive various factors (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Porter, 1980; Waller, Huber, & Glick, 1995).   
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provided an overview of prior research relevant to the study 
undertaken here and presented the foundation of the underlying theoretical viewpoints 
utilized.  Hypotheses outlining the predicted relationships between the variables of 
interest were also presented, along with prior research and theory supporting the 
development of these hypotheses.  Control variables that are expected to impact the 
hypothesized relationships were presented as well.   
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The following chapter provides an overview of the methodology used to analyze 
these hypotheses, including the sample, measures, and statistical methods.  Presentation 
of the methods is followed in Chapter 4 by an overview of the findings of the study, as 
well as the results of the tests of the hypotheses.  The paper concludes in the final chapter 
with a discussion of the implications and limitations of the study and avenues for future 
research. 
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Chapter Three: 
Measures and Methodology 
 While the preceding chapter outlined the hypothesized relationships, this chapter 
provides details of the methodology utilized to empirically examine those relationships.  
This chapter begins with a general discussion of the methodology, followed by outlining 
the specifics of the sample chosen.  Next, the variables are discussed and the data 
collection procedure described.  The chapter concludes with presentation of the analysis 
methods employed. 
 As this research focuses on the impact of CEOs on their organization’s strategies 
and, ultimately, the performance implications of both of these items of interest, it is 
necessary to select a sample that provides access to the necessary data.  In order to 
address this and help account for industry effects, public companies in two different 
industries comprise the sample.  The variables are drawn from and defined based on prior 
work in the literature, including suggested demographic variables for the CEO and 
various organization control variables.  The use of public companies provides access to a 
number of measures invaluable to this research, including performance and top 
management information.  In addition, Diction software was utilized to collect content 
analysis data from public statements contained in the popular press and communication 
with stockholders.  The data collected was analyzed through multiple regression utilizing 
SPSS 17.  All of these areas are discussed in greater detail below. 
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3.1 Sample 
 Due to the nature of the data needed to complete the analysis, public companies 
were identified as most appropriate for the sample.  A number of reasons for this can be 
cited.  Access to data on personal characteristics of CEOs was necessary and is often not 
available for smaller, private organizations (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990).  In addition, 
the use of public companies allows for access to standardized performance data.  Letters 
to shareholders from public filings, as discussed later, have been a valuable resource in 
prior studies of this nature.  Finally, large public companies are more likely to be featured 
in the popular press, providing data points for the content analysis. 
 Two different industries were chosen for the sample in order to facilitate 
identification of industry effects in the results and provide additional context.  Hambrick 
and Mason (1984) discussed the importance of considering different industries and noted 
a number of important factors including who may be considered for top management 
positions in certain industries and how characteristics such as industry vitality will impact 
research in the area.  There is also the continuing debate in the literature regarding how 
much variance in performance can be attributed to the organization and how much is due 
to the industry in which they operate.  Schmalensee (1985) was one of the first to address 
this and stated that the evidence from the study showed there were no organization effects 
on performance, while industry accounted for 75% of the variance.  Rumelt (1991) 
countered with research that showed business unit was the most important factor in 
performance variance.  This examination was taken further by McGahan and Porter 
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(1997), who returned the focus to the impact of the industry.  Most recently, Hawawini et 
al. (2003) suggest that the industry is the dominant factor for average performers and 
individual firm effects are only more significant for the best and worst performers in an 
industry.   In order to address the concerns regarding business unit versus corporate 
outcomes expressed in much of this research (McGahan & Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1991), 
industries were chosen in which the organizations tend to focus on one primary offering. 
 The first industry selected was the world-wide automotive industry (SIC code 
3711).  The second industry selected was United States retailers (SIC codes beginning 
with 5).  These two industries provide a comparison of one international sample and one 
US domestic sample, as well as a wide variety of large organizations.  The top 20 public 
independent companies in each industry according to 2008 sales were chosen as the 
sample, following the suggestion by Fombrun and Shanley (1990) that the largest firms 
will receive the most public scrutiny and thus there will be more information available on 
those organizations.  For the retail industry, the ranking by Stores.org was utilized to 
identify the top 20.  The rankings in the automotive industry were determined by the 
Ward’s Automotive listing of market share, which resulted in only 13 companies that met 
the criteria of being publicly owned, independent organizations, as some of the top 20 
nameplates were wholly owned subsidiaries of others on the list.  For each organization, 
the CEO was identified as the person of interest.   
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3.2 Variables 
 In order to effectively examine the hypothesized relationships, a number of 
independent, dependent, and control variables were identified in the extant literature.  
The primary independent variables identified were CEO aggressiveness and organization 
competitive aggressiveness, although organization competitive aggressiveness was a 
dependent variable in one of the analyses.  The primary dependent variable was 
organization performance.  Control variables included characteristics of the CEO (tenure 
and functional background) and characteristics of the organization (age and size).  In 
addition, each organization was coded for industry as a dichotomous variable.  Each of 
these variables is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
3.2.1 Organization Performance 
 Numerous issues have been raised with using accounting measures of 
performance (Fisher & McGowan, 1983).  One example of a shortcoming of financial 
performance measures from secondary sources include the data being aggregated to the 
organizational level as opposed to the business-unit level (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 
1986).  In this study, the focus is on industries with a dominant product, which helps to 
limit the impact of this shortcoming.   Given that these measures are still very popular in 
the literature, they were utilized despite their shortcomings in order to make the results 
comparable to other research and due to the availability of the data (Mackey, 2008).  The 
first measure utilized was Return on Assets (ROA) (Fombrun & Ginsberg, 1990b; 
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Stambaugh et al., 2009; Young, Smith, & Grimm, 1996).  The second performance 
measure utilized was Return on Investment (ROI) (Armstrong & Collopy, 1996; Smith et 
al., 1994).  Both performance measures were lagged one year, as suggested by prior 
research in the area (Goll, Brown Johnson, & Rasheed, 2008; Henderson, Miller, & 
Hambrick, 2006; Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007).  This is often done to allow time for 
changes in strategy and CEO action to impact organization performance (Smith, Grimm, 
& Gannon, 1992). 
 
3.2.2  CEO Aggressiveness 
 Kets de Vries (1984), in a section of the book “The Irrational Executive”, 
develops a number of different patterns of behavior in the workplace that can result from 
the way in which the individual handles and targets their aggression.  While individual 
aggressiveness is somewhat limited in the Strategy literature, it has been found in the 
psychology literature to contain a trait component that will be consistent for that 
individual (Anderson, Buckley, & Carnagey, 2008; Blickle, Habasch, & Senft, 1998).  
This portion of individual aggressiveness has been studied extensively due to its 
consistency across situations and its stability over time (Coie et al., 1999).  In addition, 
research has shown that those individuals who possess higher levels of trait 
aggressiveness will often become involved in more hostile situations, sometimes due to 
their effect on others through dyadic interactions (Anderson et al., 2008).  Verbal 
aggressiveness has been shown to be a stable personality trait as well (Blickle et al., 
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1998), along with the ability to impact the compliance of others under some 
circumstances (Boster & Levine, 1988).   
Aggression is one of the aspects of communication specifically measured by the 
DICTION software utilized in the study and discussed in more detail later.  The value for 
CEO aggressiveness was obtained as the standardized DICTION score for aggressiveness 
from all the CEO statements combined within a given year.  The same value was 
computed for shareholder letters.  DICTION also provides different approaches to this 
calculation depending upon the context in which the comments were made.  CEO 
statements were analyzed as corporate public relations.  Shareholder letters were 
analyzed as corporate financial reports. 
 
3.2.3 Organization Competitive Aggressiveness 
 Following the approach taken by previous studies examining similar constructs 
(Stambaugh et al., 2009; Yu & Cannella Jr, 2005a), competitive aggressiveness is defined 
here as put forth by Lumpkin and Dess (1996:148) as “a firm’s propensity to directly and 
intensely challenge its competitors to achieve entry or improve position, that is, to 
outperform industry rivals in the marketplace.”  Another important component of 
competitive aggressiveness mentioned by Lumpkin and Dess (1996) as prevalent in 
aggressive organizations is their willingness to eschew more traditional forms of 
competitive moves and try new tactics.  This aggressiveness has been shown to impact a 
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number of areas of the organization, including corporate entrepreneurship (Dean, 
Thibodeaux, Beyerlein, Ebrahimi, & Molina, 1993) 
 A number of different actions were identified based on the prior research in order 
to provide organization actions that would be considered in the content analysis.  In 
keeping with the aforementioned definition provided by Lumpkin and Dess (1996), the 
focus in this study is on actions that organizations take in order to compete for demand.  
Lumpkin and Dess make the distinction between proactiveness (performing a competitive 
action first) and aggressiveness (competing for demand), although it is noted that some 
actions could include aspects of both (i.e. first to introduce a product that will take 
demand from a competitor).  They also suggest that competitively aggressive moves will 
be those that challenge competitors and aim to outperform rivals in the marketplace.  
Given this, actions indentified in this study as competitively aggressive had to be related 
to the competition and increasing market share.  Thus, actions that could be considered 
aggressive or proactive in general (such as suddenly closing locations) were not 
considered competitively aggressive as they were not generally viewed as an act taken in 
pursuit of additional demand or in the interest of challenging a competitor, who may 
actually have their position improved by such an action.  
Covin and Covin (1990) cite a number of prior studies in their development of 
tactics that could be considered aggressive.  They note the importance of being a first 
mover (Lieberman et al., 1988) and surprise as a sign of competitive aggressiveness.  The 
definition of competitive aggressiveness utilized in their study specifically mentions 
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being the first organization to introduce a product.  Grimm et al. (2005) note innovation 
and the development of such new products as an example of an aggressive competitive 
move, as well as a sign of disruptive competition, along with price cuts. 
Covin and Covin (1990) also include taking actions that competitors respond to as 
a sign of competitive aggressiveness.  Smith, Grimm, and Gannon (1992), in their study 
of competitive interactions, found price cuts and new product introductions to be the most 
common competitive moves that would prompt a reaction from competitors.  Price cuts 
were also identified by Chen and MacMillan (1992) as a special case of competitive 
action.  Their study found that price moves of more than 10% were more likely to be met 
with a response and the response was quicker.  Stambaugh et al. (2009) also suggest that 
the combination of an aggressive competitive stance with an emphasis on cost leadership 
leads to higher performance.  Several examples of price cuts as an aggressive competitive 
move can be found in recent decisions made by organizations (Grimm et al., 2005). 
 Entry into new markets is another competitive move that is often identified with 
aggressiveness in the literature.  Dean et al. (1993) examined entry into new markets in 
their study of corporate entrepreneurship and found competitive aggressiveness to be the 
variable most associated with such actions.  Fombrun and Ginsberg (1990) used market 
development as one of the factors in determining the aggressiveness of organizations as 
well.  Grimm et al. (2005) provide Holiday Inn’s entry into a variety of new market 
segments as an innovative and aggressive move on that organization’s part, along with 
other examples.  Several studies by Ferrier and colleagues (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 
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2002b; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999) also suggest that lack of aggressiveness by those 
firms that are market share leaders allows challengers and new entrants that are more 
aggressive to gain a significant amount of market share.   
It is noted here that new product introductions and new market entry will be 
identified as similar by the data collection method, discussed in greater detail later.  
However, the value of the competitive aggressiveness variable in the analysis is 
calculated as the combined instances of the above actions, in keeping with the attack 
volume component of competitive aggressiveness previously used in the literature 
(Ferrier, 2001; Smith, Grimm, Wally, & Young, 1997; Young et al., 1996).  Due to this, 
any issues with classifying an action as a new product or entry into a new market are 
limited as the action will still be counted as a contributor to competitive aggressiveness.  
Table 3.1 provides the words included in the content analysis as representative of each 
competitive action.  The majority of the terms were adapted from prior work in the area 
(Ferrier & Lyon, 2004; Ferrier et al., 2002b). 
 
Table 3.1 Content Analysis Identifiers 
Terms 
Price price (cut), rate, discount, rebate 
Product introduce, launch, 
unveil, roll out 
Market enter, expanded 
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3.2.4 Control Variables 
 Several control variables were identified based on prior research that considered 
similar relationships.  These variables consist mainly of characteristics of the CEO and 
the organization.  For CEO characteristics, tenure and functional background were 
identified.  As for the organization, age and size were considered.   
 While Hambrick and Mason (1984) hypothesized a number of relationships with 
the age of top managers, including organizations with younger managers achieving 
greater growth and pursuing riskier strategies than organizations with older managers, 
age was not included due to concerns regarding multicollinearity between age and tenure 
(Goll et al., 2008).  Based on the findings of Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), in which 
tenure was found to be a predictor in more cases than age, tenure was selected.   CEO 
tenure has also been found to be associated with organization performance, in a generally 
inverted U-shape in which performance increases early in a CEO’s tenure, only to decline 
later (Henderson et al., 2006).  Papadakis and Barwise (2002) found CEO tenure to have 
the greatest impact among six CEO and top management team characteristics on strategic 
decision-making, finding longer-tenured CEOs tend to lead organizations that made more 
rational decisions and display better communication.  Tenure was measured as the 
number of years a CEO held the position (Henderson et al., 2006). 
  The functional background of top managers has also been suggested to impact a 
number of firm behaviors such as diversification and administrative complexity 
(Hambrick et al., 1984; Porter, 1980).  An executive’s background can also influence 
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how they perceive aspects of the organization, such as performance (Waller et al., 1995).  
The majority of the work in this area focuses on the heterogeneity of background 
experiences among top management teams (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996).  However, 
these studies do provide suggestions for appropriate categories.  Following the work of 
Chattopadhyay et al. (1999), CEOs in this study were identified as having a background 
in one of eight categories: sales, marketing, accounting, finance, R&D, general 
administration, personnel, and production/operations.   
 As for control variables related to the organizations themselves, firm age and firm 
size were also obtained (Smith et al., 2001).  The size of organizations has been shown to 
have a number of impacts on competitive behavior such as the speed and visibility of 
their competitive moves (Chen & Hambrick, 1995), as well as competitive 
aggressiveness (Baum & Korn, 1996; Lin, 2006).  Goll et al (2008) also included 
organization size, in this case due to the proposition that size, when measured as total 
assets, could influence profitability.  A similar approach, using total assets, is often 
utilized in the literature (Ferrier et al., 2004; Magnan & St-Onge, 1997; Peterson, 
Martorana, Smith, & Owens, 2003).  Age of the organization was simply the number of 
years since the organization was founded (Henderson et al., 2006; Lubatkin et al., 2006; 
Nadkarni et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 1996). 
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3.3 Data Collection 
 Performance data (ROI and ROA), industry ranking, CEO control variables, and 
organization control variables were obtained from a combination of LexisNexis Company 
Dossier, COMPUSTAT, Morningstar, and company websites.  Functional background 
was coded as the category in which the CEO was most experienced (Hambrick et al., 
1996). 
In order to obtain data on the aggressiveness of CEOs, computer-aided text 
analysis was employed (Kabanoff, 1997) to perform a structured content analysis.  
Structured content analysis has been identified as dramatically improving the study of 
competitive dynamics due to access to larger samples over longer periods of time (Smith 
et al., 2001).  This is a method that has been utilized repeatedly in strategy and other 
organizational research domains (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier 
et al., 2002a; Kabanoff, 1997; Morris, 1994; Short & Palmer, 2008; Smith et al., 2001).  
Computer-aided text analysis can be undertaken to obtain data on a number of topics of 
interest, such as the sentiments and intentions of top managers, that would normally be 
difficult to obtain (Morris, 1994).  In addition, computerized coding of content provides 
several advantages over human coding of content including perfect reliability (Weber, 
1988), easy manipulation of coding rules, and the ability to code larger data sets (Morris, 
1994).  The analysis for aggressiveness was performed utilizing DICTION software, 
which is discussed next.   
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3.4 Use of DICTION Software 
A specific software package that has been recommended for use in Strategy 
research to complete computer-aided text analysis is DICTION (Short et al., 2008).  Short 
et al. recommend DICTION because of its use of artificial intelligence elements and basis 
in linguistic theory, along with consideration of business texts during the software’s 
development.  DICTION is also noted for allowing research to consider the tone of 
statements made in the text (Ketchen Jr, Boyd, & Bergh, 2008).  DICTION software also 
specifically identifies language related to aggressiveness, among other linguistic 
characteristics, which is especially applicable to this research.  DICTION has also been 
used in related studies such as charismatic leadership (Bligh, Kohles, & Meindl, 2004) 
and communication of financial results (Yuthas, Rogers, & Dillard, 2002).  Short et al. 
(2008:729) draw on prior research to present “content analysis of text offers considerable 
potential to gain key insights into the thinking of top managers and, in following, the 
choices they make”.  In addition, content analysis has been suggested as providing insight 
into the cognitions of managers due to the words they use based on the Whorf-Sapir 
hypothesis (Abrahamson et al., 1997) and providing an idea of the perspective taken by 
top management (Porter, 1980).  
 DICTION was utilized to analyze letters to shareholders for each company in the 
sample over the five-year period covered by identifying the number of times the concepts 
identified in the discussion of variables above occurred.  The years 2003-2007 were 
selected to avoid the confounds of the recent change in the economic environment.  
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Content analysis of letters to shareholders is a common practice in the strategy literature 
and has several benefits, such as being one of the few methods that allows for comparison 
of cognitions across and within various industries (Abrahamson et al., 1997).  In addition 
to analysis of letters to shareholders, publications were identified for each industry and 
analyzed for the same concepts.  Trade publications are another popular source for 
content analysis in the literature and have been used in a variety of studies (Chen & 
MacMillan, 1992a; Chen et al., 1992b; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991).  For the 
automobile industry, Automotive News was selected.  In the absence of available access 
to a more focused trade publication for the retailing industry, Business Week was 
selected.  Business Week was chosen because it provides profiles of numerous 
individuals, companies, and industries, as well as providing significantly expanded online 
content (Katz & Katz, 2010).  As previously mentioned, DICTION includes several 
different contexts that can be used when analyzing the text.  In this research, letters to the 
shareholders were analyzed as “corporate financial reports”, while “corporate public 
relations” was the context used for CEO statements. 
 
3.5 Analysis Methods 
 All of the hypotheses were tested utilizing SPSS 17.  SPSS was chosen because it 
provided all of the tools necessary to test the hypotheses and is commonly utilized in the 
literature (Keegan & Kabanoff, 2008; Resick et al., 2009; Smith, Young, Becerra, & 
Grimm, 1996).  To test Hypothesis 1, that CEO aggressiveness would be positively 
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related to the aggressiveness of their organizations, the measures for CEO aggressiveness 
and the control variables were entered into a multiple regression analysis as independent 
variables with organization aggressiveness as the dependent variable.  Hypothesis 2, that 
competitive aggressiveness of organizations will be positively related to organization 
performance, was tested in a similar manner.  Competitive aggressiveness of the 
organizations was an independent variable, along with the control variables, and the 
performance measures were the dependent variables.  A separate regression was 
performed for each measure of performance.   
The hypothesis that more aggressive CEOs would be associated with better 
company performance was also analyzed in a similar manner.  However, it is noted that 
any effects could be due to the impact of CEO aggressiveness on organization 
aggressiveness.  As is suggested by Hypothesis 2, it is possible that CEO aggressiveness 
only impacts organization performance through the association with organization 
aggressiveness.  This would imply that organization aggressiveness is a mediator of the 
relationship.  Stated another way, aggressive CEOs are associated with aggressive 
organizations, which tend to perform better.  In order to test this hypothesis, a path 
analysis model was constructed.  For the final hypothesis, that the alignment of CEO 
aggressiveness and organization aggressiveness would be associated with higher 
performance, another regression was performed with the interaction of the two variables 
included.   In addition, CEOs and organizations were divided into low, medium, and high 
levels of aggressiveness.  This produced nine groups (i.e. low-low, medium-medium, 
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etc.), which were then analyzed with an ANOVA to determine if there were significant 
differences in the mean performance across groups for either performance variable.   
 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
 The methodology for the study has been outlined in this chapter.  The sample of 
major retailers and the largest organizations in the automobile industry was discussed, 
along with the definition and measures for the variables of interest.  The next chapter 
provides an overview of the findings and results of the hypothesis tests.  The final chapter 
discusses the implications of the findings, limitations of the research, and potential 
avenues for future research.   
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Chapter Four: 
Results 
 This chapter outlines the results of the analysis outlined in Chapter Three.  First, 
descriptive statistics for the aforementioned variables are presented.  This is followed by 
an overview of the bivariate correlations among the variables and discussion of important 
relationships that emerged.  The chapter concludes with presentation of the hypothesis 
tests.   
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the variables in the study are presented in Table 4.1 
below.  The CEO Aggressiveness and Letter Aggressiveness values were the 
standardized values for aggressiveness reported by DICTION.  Average Aggressiveness 
is the average of the CEO and Letter Aggression values for each year for each 
organization.  Price, Product, and Market Aggressiveness represent the number of 
aggressive moves identified in the periodicals for each organization by year, while 
Organization Aggressiveness is the sum of all these acts for that year.   
Some interesting notes regarding the data emerge from these statistics.  Due to 18 
succession events during the sample timeframe, a number of CEOs had tenure of one 
year or less for several of the observations.  Also, CEO backgrounds in the sample were 
heavily biased, with general administration the most popular followed by 
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production/operations.  This can be seen in the high mean value for CEO Background, as 
well as the small standard deviation.   
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
4.2 Bivariate Correlations 
The bivariate correlations between variables are presented in Table 4.2.  This 
table includes the individual components of aggressiveness (statements and shareholder 
letters for CEOs and product, market, and price for organizations), as well as the 
combined scores.  Significant correlations are shaded in the table.  While no relationships 
were specifically hypothesized for the correlations, some interesting relationships are 
present.  These are discussed following the table.
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In regards to the variables that are the primary focus of this research, it is 
interesting to note the significant correlations between Organization Aggressiveness and 
both performance measures (ROA and ROI).  However, contrary to what is expected 
based on our hypotheses, this relationship is negative for both ROA (r=-.302, p<.01) and 
ROI (r=-.275, p<.01), suggesting that Organization Aggressiveness is associated with 
poorer performance for the organizations in the sample.  The measures for CEO 
Aggressiveness were significantly correlated with each other (r=.387, p<.01), suggesting 
a consistency of message across letters to the shareholders and statements CEOs make to 
the press.  CEO Quote Aggressiveness was found to be significantly correlated with a 
dichotomous variable to identify CEOs that only held the position for a portion of the 
year (r=.261, p<.05).  In conjunction with the significant negative correlation this 
variable has with CEO Tenure (r=-.224, p<.05), it is possible that CEOs who have 
recently entered the position or know they are on their way out are more willing to make 
aggressive statements in public.  Finally, CEO Aggressiveness was positively and 
significantly correlated with Organization Size (r=.188, p<.01), which is posited here to 
possibly be due to CEOs of larger organizations believing they are in a position to be 
more aggressive, especially in letters to shareholders. 
As for the control variables, both organizational variables (Age and Size) 
displayed significant correlations with a number of other variables.  Older organizations 
were associated with poorer performance on both ROA (r=-.482, p<.01) and ROI (r=-
.282, p<.01).  In addition to the relationship between size and CEO Aggressiveness 
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mentioned previously, size was also associated with several other variables, including a 
negative relationship with both ROI (r=-.331, p<.01) and ROA (r=-.427, p<.01).  Size 
also displayed a significant large positive association with Price Aggressiveness (r=.715, 
p<.01), which may be due to larger organizations having the resources to engage in price 
cuts, perhaps due to the pressure they can exert on suppliers (i.e. Wal-Mart). 
Finally, industry played a very significant role in the correlation analysis, as it 
was significantly associated with all but three of the other variables.  Overall, the 
correlations suggest more aggressiveness is present in the automotive industry, both from 
a CEO standpoint (r=.234, p<.01) and the organization (r=.380, P<.01).  The automotive 
industry was also a poorer performer by either measure (ROA, r=-.394, p<.01 and ROI, 
r=-.256, p<.01).  Several suggestions for the prevalence of correlations with industry are 
addressed later in conjunction with the discussion of limitations and suggestions for 
future research.   
 
4.3 Tests of the Hypotheses 
In order to test the hypotheses that were developed, a number of regression 
analyses were performed.  In order to test Hypothesis 1, aggressive organizations would 
be involved with aggressive CEOs, the overall measure of CEO Aggressiveness was 
entered as an independent variable along with the control variables and industry.  The 
total measure for Organization Aggressiveness was entered as the independent variable.  
The results of the regression are presented in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Results of CEO and Organization Aggressiveness Regression 
 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Constant -1.507 1.437 
 
-1.049 .297 
Industry -.653 .605 -.100 -1.080 .283 
CEO Tenure -.029 .050 -.040 -.587 .559 
CEO Background .576 .221 .178 2.611 .010 
Organization Age -.011 .006 -.130 -1.832 .070 
Organization Size .00002 .000 .743 8.081 .000 
CEO Aggressiveness -.194 .215 -.062 -.905 .368 
 
Overall, the model is significant (F(6, 112) = 19.37, p=0.0) and accounts for 
almost 51% of the variance in Organization Aggressiveness (R²=.509).  When 
considering the first hypothesis, that CEO Aggressiveness would have a significant 
relationship with Organization Aggressiveness, the results suggest this is not the case.  
CEO Aggressiveness was not significant in the regression (p=.368).  Further evidence is 
provided by the earlier correlation analysis, in which CEO Aggressiveness and 
Organization Aggressiveness were not significantly correlated (r=.065, p>.05).  Based on 
this evidence, Hypothesis 1 is not supported.  CEO Background and Organization Size 
were the significant predictors of Organization Aggressiveness in the model (β=.178, 
p=.10 and β=.743, p=.00, respectively).  While CEO Background will be discussed in 
greater detail later, the strong significant results for Organization Size suggest that larger 
organizations tend to be more aggressive.  Industry and CEO Tenure were not significant, 
while Organization Age could be considered to be marginally significant (β=-.130, p<.1). 
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Hypothesis 2 posited that better performance would be displayed by more 
aggressive organizations.  To test this hypothesis, Organization Aggressiveness was 
entered into the regression as an independent variable, along with the control variables 
(including Industry).  Two regressions were performed, one with each of the performance 
measures, ROA and ROI, as the dependent variable.  The results of these regressions are 
provided in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, followed by discussion of each regression individually.   
Table 4.4 Results of Organization Aggressiveness and ROA Regression 
ROA B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Constant 19.009 3.336 
 
5.698 .000 
Industry -1.584 1.389 -.112 -1.140 .257 
CEO Tenure -.371 .116 -.232 -3.211 .002 
CEO Background -.325 .523 -.046 -.622 .535 
Organization Age -.092 .014 -.489 -6.408 .000 
Organization Size .000 .000 -.138 -1.132 .260 
Organization Aggressiveness -.403 .220 -.183 -1.835 .069 
 
The model from the regression examining Organization Aggressiveness and ROA 
is significant (F(6, 118) = 14.43, p=0.0) and explains a good amount of the variance in 
ROA (R²=.423).  In regards to the hypothesis that aggressive organizations will be 
associated with greater performance, the results do not support this conclusion.  
Organization Aggressiveness is, at best, marginally significant in the regression and the 
relationship is in the opposite direction of that hypothesized (β=-.183, p<.1).  The only 
significant predictors in the model were CEO Tenure (β=-.232, p<.01) and Organization 
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Age (β=-.489, p=0.0) and presented that younger organizations or those with newer 
CEOs would tend to perform better as measured by ROA.   
Table 4.5 Results of Organization Aggressiveness and ROI Regression 
ROI B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Constant 37.656 15.032 
 
2.505 .014 
Industry .278 7.341 .005 .038 .970 
CEO Tenure -.608 .526 -.107 -1.156 .250 
CEO Background -.850 2.354 -.034 -.361 .719 
Organization Age -.164 .067 -.235 -2.443 .016 
Organization Size .000 .000 -.185 -1.120 .265 
Organization Aggressiveness -.999 1.008 -.128 -.991 .324 
 
A significant model was also obtained from the regression that utilized ROI as the 
performance outcome (F(6, 104) = 3.23, p<.01).  However, this model did not account for 
as much variance in the dependent variable as the prior models, explaining almost 16% of 
the variance (R²=.157).  Once again, Organization Aggressiveness was not significant in 
the regression, leading to the conclusion that the hypothesis is not supported for the 
second measure of performance, ROI (β=-.991, p>.05).  The only significant predictor 
that emerged from this analysis was Organization Age (β=-.235, p<.05), once again 
suggesting that younger organizations performed better.   
Hypothesis 3a stated that improved organization performance would be associated 
with aggressive CEOs.  In order to effectively address this hypothesis, the relationship 
must also take Hypothesis 2 into account and make a determination if this is a direct 
relationship or due to the impact on Organization Aggressiveness.  Based on the results 
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from the test of Hypothesis 2, it is logical to conclude that this is not the case.  In fact, the 
most likely assumption would be that such a relationship would actually lead to 
decreased performance given the prior results.  In order to fully address this, a path 
analysis was performed through the use of several regressions in SPSS.   
The results of the test for the first hypothesis provide one analysis needed for the 
path analysis, as it provides the relationship between CEO Aggressiveness and 
Organization Aggressiveness.  The second hypothesis test also provides information that 
is useful for completing the path analysis, the relationship between Organization 
Aggressiveness and the two measures of performance.  The additional regression needed 
to complete the path analysis is one in which CEO Aggressiveness is the independent 
variable and the two measures of performance are the dependent variables.  All analyses 
were performed with the control variables included.  The results of these analyses are 
presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 below, followed by the completed path analysis models, 
one for each measure of performance, in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
Table 4.6 Results of CEO Aggressiveness and ROA Regression 
ROA B Std. Error Beta T Sig. 
Constant 19.378 3.496 
 
5.543 .000 
Industry -1.137 1.472 -.079 -.772 .442 
CEO Tenure -.351 .121 -.220 -2.911 .004 
CEO Background -.563 .537 -.079 -1.047 .297 
Organization Age -.088 .015 -.454 -5.809 .000 
Organization Size .000 .000 -.280 -2.755 .007 
CEO Aggressiveness .253 .523 .037 .483 .630 
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Table 4.7 Results of CEO Aggressiveness and ROI Regression 
ROI B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Constant 38.623 15.426 
 
2.504 .014 
Industry .207 7.518 .004 .028 .978 
CEO Tenure -.496 .537 -.087 -.924 .358 
CEO Background -1.663 2.364 -.067 -.704 .483 
Organization Age -.142 .069 -.200 -2.058 .042 
Organization Size .000 .000 -.279 -2.022 .046 
CEO Aggressiveness 1.021 2.507 .039 .407 .685 
 
 
(n.s.= not significant) 
Figure 4.1 Path Analysis Model for CEO Aggressiveness and ROA 
 
 
(n.s.= not significant) 
Figure 4.2 Path Analysis Model for CEO Aggressiveness and ROI 
97 
 
The path analysis provides no support for Hypothesis 3a.  CEO Aggressiveness 
has neither a direct nor indirect impact on the performance of the organization.  As can be 
seen in the path analysis models, none of the hypothesized relationships are significant.  
This is the case for both measures of performance.   
The final hypothesis, 3b, was that performance would be better for organizations 
that had alignment between the aggressiveness of their actions and the CEO.  This was 
tested in two ways.  First, an interaction term between CEO Aggressiveness and 
Organization Aggressiveness was calculated and entered as an independent variable, 
along with the control variables, in two regressions, one for each performance measure.  
The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 4.8 and 4.9. 
Table 4.8 Results of Aggressiveness Interaction and ROA Regression 
ROA B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Constant 28.361 4.616 
  
6.144 .000 
Industry -1.752 1.356 -.131 -1.292 .200 
CEO Tenure -.397 .119 -.275 -3.332 .001 
CEO Background -1.916 .761 -.216 -2.519 .014 
Organization Age -.086 .016 -.467 -5.530 .000 
Organization Size .000 .000 -.219 -1.774 .080 
Aggressiveness Interaction -.109 .153 -.077 -.712 .479 
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Table 4.9 Results of Aggressiveness Interaction and ROI Regression 
ROI B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Constant 57.220 24.498 
  
2.336 .022 
Industry -1.550 8.274 -.027 -.187 .852 
CEO Tenure -.785 .638 -.136 -1.230 .223 
CEO Background -3.241 4.045 -.093 -.801 .426 
Organization Age -.196 .087 -.254 -2.251 .027 
Organization Size .000 .000 -.170 -.961 .340 
Aggressiveness Interaction -.798 .859 -.140 -.929 .356 
 
As can been seen in the tables, the interaction term was not significant in the 
regression for either performance variable (β=-.077, p>.02 and β=-.140, p>.05, 
respectively).  This provides no support for Hypothesis 3b.  Once again, Organization 
Age was significant in both regressions (β=-.467, p=.0 and β=-.254, p<.05).  In order to 
further test this hypothesis, an ANOVA was also completed to determine if there were 
significant differences in performance across aggressiveness categories.  CEOs and 
organizations were divided into high, medium, and low levels of aggressiveness and the 
mean performance measures analyzed.  Tables 4.10 and 4.11 present the aggressiveness 
categories and means for each performance measure. 
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Table 4.10 ROA ANOVA 
  
CEO Aggressiveness 
  
Low Medium High 
O
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7.88 8.62 7.53 
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9.38 8.03 4.71 
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4.78 8.47 4.22 
 
 
Table 4.11 ROI ANOVA 
  
CEO Aggressiveness 
  
Low Medium High 
O
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22.16 14.5 18.38 
M
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m
 
19.58 16.04 0.42 
H
ig
h
 
17.36 14.98 8.46 
 
 Significant mean differences were not reported in the overall ANOVA for either 
performance outcome (F(8,138) = 1.51, Mse = 44.21, p>.05 and F(8,116) = 1.36, Mse = 
591.71, p>.05).  In order to compare the means across categories for potential significant 
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pairwise differences, the least significant difference (LSD) was calculated for each 
ANOVA.  For the ROA ANOVA, the LSD was 4.61.  Only one pairwise comparison 
including a hypothesized alignment category was significant.  This pair consisted of high 
aggressiveness CEOs/high aggressiveness organizations and low aggressiveness 
CEOs/medium aggressiveness organizations.  The LSD for the ROI ANOVA was 18.46.  
Only two pairwise comparisons displayed a significant mean difference in this ANOVA 
and both involved high aggressiveness CEOs/medium aggressiveness organizations.  A 
significant mean difference was found when comparing this aggressiveness category with 
the low aggressiveness CEOs/low aggressiveness organizations and low aggressiveness 
CEOs/medium aggressiveness organization categories.  These results also suggest no 
support for Hypothesis 3b.  
  
4.4 Chapter Summary 
In summary, none of the hypothesized relationships suggested in this research 
were supported by the findings.  CEO Aggressiveness was not associated with the 
aggressiveness of the organizations they lead.  In addition, CEO Aggressiveness had no 
significant relationship with organization performance, directly or indirectly.  A 
marginally significant relationship emerged between Organization Aggressiveness and 
performance, but was not in the direction hypothesized.  Finally, alignment between the 
aggressiveness of CEOs and their organizations was not associated with performance.  
101 
 
Only three total pairwise comparisons were significant and only one of these included a 
category in which CEO and organization aggressiveness were aligned. 
 The following chapter presents discussion of the findings.  First, the general 
findings are discussed.  This is followed by presentation of some implications of the 
findings.  The chapter concludes with discussion of the limitations and potential avenues 
for future research. 
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Chapter Five: 
Discussion and Recommendations 
 This chapter discusses the results just presented, identifies potential implications 
of these results, and provides limitations of this research and possible directions that 
could be taken by future research.  While none of the hypothesized relationships were 
supported, the information gained is still beneficial to the discipline.  In addition, several 
additional significant and interesting relationships were observed in the course of this 
research.  
 
5.1 General Discussion 
 The first hypothesis, that CEO Aggressiveness would be associated with the 
competitive aggressiveness of their firms, was not supported.  This suggests that simply 
having a CEO with aggressive tendencies will not necessarily translate into a more 
aggressive strategy for the organization.  While prior research suggests that CEO 
personality and personal characteristics can impact strategies (Boone & Brabander, 1997; 
Lewin & Stephens, 1994; Miller & Toulouse, 1986b; Thomas et al., 1989), this was not 
the case in this research.   
 Several possible explanations could be posited for this finding.  Perhaps CEOs in 
their communication to outsiders via comments to the press and letters to shareholders 
were simply attempting to “psych out” their competition by sounding more aggressive 
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but not actually intending to take action.  It may be an attempt on their part to signal 
potential actions in order to alter the future actions of others (Heil & Robertson, 1991).  It 
may also be possible the CEOs intended to act in an aggressive manner, but were unable 
to do so due to resource limitations, changes in the environment, or other unexpected 
developments.  Perhaps aggression does not translate well to the use of content analysis, 
even though content analysis is an often-used and well-received method in strategic 
management research (Morris, 1994; Short et al., 2008).  A final explanation is that CEOs 
are able to separate their personal aggressiveness that they display in their 
communications from the decision-making process, allowing them to make decisions that 
are not impacted by their aggressiveness. 
 Along with the finding that CEO Aggressiveness was not associated with 
Organization Aggressiveness, the test for Hypothesis 1 did provide two significant 
predictors.  Organization Size was significantly and positively associated with 
aggressiveness, providing evidence that larger organizations are more aggressive, which 
supports prior work in the literature (Baum et al., 1996; Lin, 2006).  This could be due to 
larger organizations having the resources necessary to take aggressive actions, such as 
introducing new products.  Another explanation is that larger organizations must be 
aggressive in order to defend themselves, as they have become a larger target for 
competitors.  The other significant predictor was CEO Background.  While this is an 
interesting finding, it is viewed as somewhat tentative due to the range restriction that 
was present in the CEO Background variable, as can be seen in the summary statistics 
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presented in Chapter 4.  Almost all of the CEOs with identifiable backgrounds were 
identified as having a general administration background.   
 Hypothesis 2 was also not supported.  While a marginally significant relationship 
was identified between Organization Aggressiveness and performance (ROA), the 
relationship was in the opposite direction hypothesized.  In this instance, the findings 
indicate that organizations that are more aggressive tended to perform poorer than those 
organizations that were less aggressive.  When ROI was utilized as the performance 
outcome, aggressiveness was not a significant predictor.  This is an interesting finding as 
prior research has found a positive relationship between aggressiveness and performance, 
above and beyond the possible negative consequences to a firm’s industry as a whole 
(Smith et al., 1991; Young et al., 1996).   
 The analysis of Organization Aggressiveness and performance was another that 
provided interesting findings in regards to the control variables.  Organization Age was a 
significant, negative predictor in both analyses.  This leads to the conclusion that younger 
organizations performed better on both measures of organization performance.  Perhaps 
these younger organizations are not subject to the same level of inertia (Gresov, 
Haveman, & Oliva, 1993; Hannan et al., 1984), allowing them to react more quickly and 
thus perform better.     
 Hypothesis 3a provided two possible underlying processes for the impact of CEO 
Aggressiveness on the performance of their organizations.  The first possibility was a 
direct relationship in which CEOs that were more aggressive lead organizations that 
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perform better.  An indirect relationship, in which CEO Aggressiveness impacted 
organization performance through its effect on Organization Aggressiveness, was the 
second possibility.  Neither of these proved to be the case in this research, leading to a 
lack of support for Hypotheses 3a.  In fact, none of the hypothesized paths in the analysis 
were significant.   
 Given the results for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, this finding is not surprising, 
as those hypotheses were instrumental in one possible path that could have explained the 
hypothesized relationship.  However, based on prior research, there is little doubt that 
CEOs impact their organizations and subsequent performance (Hambrick, 2007; Mackey, 
2008; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007).  Some potential underlying factors that could explain 
this finding are provided in the limitations section.   
 The final hypothesis examined the suggestion of fit between a CEO and their 
organization’s strategy (Drazin et al., 1985; Gupta, 1986; Hambrick et al., 1987; Van 
Clieaf, 1992).  The posited relationship was the combination of CEOs with relative 
aggressiveness similar to their organizations’ would result in improved performance.  
Both the interaction of these two measures of aggressiveness and an ANOVA examining 
various classifications based on the fit between CEOs and their organization failed to 
produce evidence supporting the posited relationship.   
 As mentioned earlier, these findings may suggest that CEOs are able to adapt, or 
at least control, their personal aggression when it comes to the decisions they make and 
the actions they take in regards to the organizations they lead.  Gupta et al. (1986) 
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identified specific characteristics of CEOs that would apply to certain strategies, leading 
to improved performance.  Based on these findings, it may be that an aggressive CEO is 
not necessary for organizations pursuing an aggressive strategy.   
 Outside of the hypothesized relationships, some additional relationships were 
present that bear mentioning.  These relationships were identified as part of the initial 
correlation analysis.  A variable was included in the analysis to indicate if a CEO 
succession event took place during that year, as CEO succession has been shown to have 
a number of effects on organizations (Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Miller, 1993).  This 
variable was significantly correlated with the aggressiveness of quotes made by the CEO 
during the year and their aggressiveness overall, but not with the aggressiveness of the 
shareholder letters.  One explanation for this is that the CEO may be more aggressive 
when they are first on the job or right before they know they are on their way out.  There 
would most likely not be an opportunity for them to have displayed this higher level of 
aggressiveness when the letters to the shareholders were written, as they were either not 
with the organization or not aware they were going to be removed at that time.  In 
addition to this, the aggressiveness of CEO quotes displayed a significant negative 
correlation with tenure.  This may be due to new CEOs being more aggressive, possibly 
as a signal to either their organization or the competition.  Another explanation is that as 
CEOs gain more experience or age they tend to be less aggressive or at least display their 
aggressiveness less often. 
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 Another correlation that is worthy of mention is the correlation between the 
aggressiveness of CEO quotes and the aggressiveness of letters to the shareholders.  This 
positive and significant relationship contributes to the research on text analysis and its 
application.  The relationship here can be viewed as support for the contention that CEOs 
are actively involved in the development of letters to shareholders (Barr, Stimpert, & 
Huff, 1992), as it presents that there is a somewhat consistent message, at least as far as 
aggressiveness, across letters to the shareholders and comments CEOs make in public. 
 Finally, the significant correlations related to industry are intriguing.  While 
industry was included as a control variable and this study did not collect the data 
necessary to significantly add to the discussion of industry effects in the literature 
(McGahan et al., 1997; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985), the findings are 
overwhelming enough to merit mention.  In short, industry was correlated with almost 
every variable in the study.  To better present this information, Table 5.1 provides a quick 
comparison of the relationships.  The table provides a general idea of how the two 
industries in the sample differed on a few of the variables where a significant correlation 
was reported.   
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Table 5.1 Comparison of Industries 
  Automotive Retail 
CEO Aggressiveness More Aggressive Less Aggressive 
Organization Aggressiveness More Aggressive Less Aggressive 
CEO Tenure Shorter Tenure Longer Tenure 
Organization Age Older Organizations Younger Organizations 
Organization Size Larger Organizations Smaller Organizations 
ROA  Poorer Performance Better Performance 
ROI Poorer Performance Better Performance 
 
 While both industries had a similar number of succession events, the retail 
industry had multiple CEOs with double-digit tenures, while the automotive industry only 
had one.  The retail industry displayed significantly better performance during the years 
of the study, but the automotive industry was negatively impacted by the decline of two 
major organizations, General Motors and Ford.  The automotive industry was more 
aggressive overall, which since both industries have been known to be competitive, may 
represent an interesting characteristic of the industry as a whole (need to be more 
aggressive to become CEO, automotive companies look for more aggressive CEOs, etc.).  
This finding receives additional attention in the limitations section.   
 The next two sections discuss the implications of the findings for this study.  The 
first section provides some implications for researchers.  This is followed by discussion 
of implications for practitioners.  After presentation of the implications, limitations as 
well as avenues for future research are provided.  Following the suggestions for future 
research, general conclusions are discussed. 
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5.2 Implications for Research 
 This section provides a number of implications for research that result from the 
findings of the study.  Some of these implications are also related to suggestions for 
future research and are thus discussed further in the fourth section of this chapter as well.  
Several implications for practice also result from these findings and are discussed in the 
following section.   
One finding from this study that provides implications for research is the lack of a 
significant relationship between CEO Aggressiveness and Organization Aggressiveness.  
If these results are replicated and hold true, one implication for research is that some 
personality characteristics of top management may not have an impact on the actions of 
their firms.  If this is the case, research will need to identify what CEO characteristics 
translate into an impact on organization performance and actions.  Perhaps categories of 
characteristics can be developed based on underlying factors that determine whether they 
will impact the organization.  However, it is important to not overlook the wide range of 
ways in which CEO characteristics could influence the CEO’s impact on the 
organization, as Hambrick and Mason (1984) outlined a number of processes, such as top 
management characteristics influencing perceptions.  So while CEO Aggressiveness was 
not directly related to the aggressive actions of organizations, their aggressiveness, and 
other characteristics, may be influencing organization actions in other ways. 
Some of the possible explanations for the lack of a significant relationship also 
provide implications for research.  One aspect to take into account is the suggestion that 
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aggressive comments are signaling actions that a CEO may not actually intend to pursue.  
This could lead to identifying CEOs as more aggressive than they actually are.  However, 
another consideration is that the perception of a CEO’s aggressiveness by competitors in 
such a circumstance may be just as interesting as the actual aggressiveness.  The other 
implication for researchers is to consider what may have prevented CEOs from fulfilling 
intended aggressive actions, which could also lead to differences in intended and actual 
aggressiveness.   
A related implication stems from the lack of a relationship when examining the fit 
between CEOs and their organizations’ strategies.  In this study, performance was not 
found to be affected by a match between CEO Aggressiveness and Organization 
Aggressiveness.  This leads to the implication for research that when studying fit between 
CEOs and strategies that the most appropriate match may not occur when the CEO 
personally displays a characteristic that seems associated with the preferred strategy.   
 The marginally significant negative relationship between the aggressiveness of 
organizations and their performance (ROA) also has research implications.  While a 
positive relationship between aggressiveness and performance is generally found in the 
literature (Smith et al., 1991; Young et al., 1996), this finding suggests that additional 
consideration could be given to the potential for an inverse relationship.  Research could 
identify under what conditions each of these relationships may occur.   
 The correlations of CEO Aggressiveness with CEO succession events and the 
aggressiveness of CEO quotes with the aggressiveness of letters to shareholders both 
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provide research implications.  The second correlation implies that prior research 
suggesting CEOs are involved in the formulation of letters to shareholders (Barr et al., 
1992) is correct and could continue to be utilized in research in the area.  The first 
strengthens the findings on the various impacts of succession (Kesner et al., 1994) by 
adding another aspect that is influenced by such events.   
 
5.3 Implications for Practice 
One of the first implications for practitioners that can be provided from this 
research concerns the aggressiveness of organizations and their performance.  In this 
study, increased Organization Aggressiveness displayed a marginally significant negative 
association with the performance of organizations.  The implication of this finding for 
practicing managers is that firms who compete less aggressively may have the 
opportunity to perform better.  Perhaps, given that both outcomes were based on returns, 
those organizations that compete more aggressively do not efficiently utilize their assets.  
Aggressively cutting prices, for example, may have reduced margins for retailers and 
automotive manufacturers alike, leading to reduced performance on these measures.  
These findings may run counter to those of Young et al. (1996) and present that in the 
industries studied the negative impact of aggressiveness on the industry did eventually 
overcome the benefits of acting aggressively.  On the other hand, there were 
organizations in both industries that displayed good performance, suggesting that this 
may not be the case.   
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Organizations in the study that seemingly had a good match between the 
aggressiveness of their CEO and the aggressiveness of the organization did not display 
significantly improved performance in regards to either measure (ROA or ROI).  Based 
on these findings, it may be that an aggressive CEO is not necessary for organizations 
pursuing an aggressive strategy; a finding that provides a practical implication for 
organizations selecting CEOs.  These findings might also suggest when organizations are 
selecting top management that the personality displayed by potential CEOs may not 
translate into action once they are in control of the organization. In addition, those 
selecting new CEOs will want to carefully consider what characteristics may or may not 
have the desired impact on the organization that they seek to obtain through a succession 
event. 
As previously mentioned, younger organizations tended to perform better among 
those in this study.  One suggested explanation for this was older organizations suffering 
from inertia and being unable to adjust quickly enough to changing conditions, which 
may have been an issue towards the end of the time frame considered in this study.  
While practitioners cannot turn back the clock and make their organization suddenly 
younger in the pursuit of improved performance, it may carry the implication that being 
aware of inertia that is developing and attempting to minimize the impact will have 
positive performance implications. 
There are implications for practitioners outside of the focal firm as well.  For 
those involved in making investment decisions, deciding to extend credit, and others, 
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these findings suggest that aggressive organizations and possibly aggressive CEOs can be 
a factor in reduced performance.  Practitioners can also apply these findings to 
competitive analysis of others in their industry.  They may consider allowing other 
organizations to take a more aggressive approach without responding in kind, as this 
approach could lead to improved performance.   
 Possibly the most important overall implication for practice regards the selection 
of aggressive individuals as CEO in general.  While there may be a common perception 
of CEOs as aggressive individuals, selection of such individuals for the position may not 
be warranted.  One such example is Robert Nardelli, who held the position with Home 
Depot.  While he was often cited as an aggressive individual, his strategies ultimately 
failed to provide the expected results (Grow, Brady, & Arndt, 2006; Grow et al., 2007).  
This research implies that the personal aggressiveness of the CEO most likely has little 
impact on the strategies the organization will pursue and the eventual performance 
outcomes from those strategies.  The results suggest that if an impact of aggressive CEOs 
was posited, the implications for performance would most likely be negative and those 
selecting a CEO on this basis may not obtain the outcome they expected.  
 
5.4 Limitations of the Study and Directions for Future Research 
 This study represents an exploratory look into the connections between CEO 
personality, competitive aggressiveness, and organization performance.  With this, come 
several limitations.  However, it is hoped that this research will provide the basis for 
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future studies to explore similar research and expand on the relationships discussed here.  
In order to facilitate this, the limitations of the study are presented in conjunction with 
suggestions for future research. 
 First, the nature of the study and the data collection does not allow for any 
statements regarding causality.  While the data was collected over a five-year period, 
each company year was treated as a separate observation and not tracked across time.  
Future research should examine these research questions in a longitudinal manner.   
 Related to this topic is the choice of years for which data was collected.  The 
timeframe 2003-2007 was chosen to somewhat limit the impact of recent changes in the 
business environment.  The hope was to avoid a major shift occurring in the middle of the 
data collection timeframe, although the automotive industry had started to experience a 
shift already.  However, this is not to say that this is not an important area for future 
study.  These relationships are likely to be even more important under the current 
circumstances and should be investigated when a suitable timeframe is available.   
One aspect that this research did not measure that could have influenced the 
relationships is managerial discretion (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Finkelstein et al., 1990; 
Finkelstein et al., 2007; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Hambrick et al., 1987).  As is 
noted in the research on managerial discretion, CEOs who lack discretion will have less 
of an impact on their organization.  This can be influenced by a number of factors, 
including the industry (Hambrick et al., 1987).  It is possible that the lack of a 
relationship between the primary variables of interest is due to a lack of managerial 
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discretion in the industries selected.  This would make it possible to have very aggressive 
CEOs who are unable to impact the aggressiveness of their organizations.  Future 
research in the area should include discretion measures in order to identify if a lack of 
discretion is influencing the results.  Perhaps there is a different impact for discretion 
when personality is considered.  In order to help facilitate the analysis in a study such as 
this one, development of discretion as an individual manager-level variable would be 
useful and could provide valuable insights as well (Finkelstein, 1998). 
 Another limitation of this research that could be addressed in future studies is the 
level of aggression.  This study considered the number of aggressive actions across three 
categories.  However, the intensity of these acts was not considered on either an act-by-
act basis or a category basis.  Obviously, some acts in the same category would convey 
different levels of aggressiveness.  For example, a 5% price cut on a major category of 
products would be considered aggressive, but a 10% price cut across the board would be 
much more aggressive.  Future research could integrate different levels of aggressiveness 
for the acts considered. 
 A related limitation concerning the measure of competitive aggressiveness is the 
aspect of competitive aggressiveness considered.  Only one aspect of competitive action 
was considered in this research, attack volume (Ferrier, 2001).  Future research could 
address this by including one or more of the remaining aspects: unpredictability, duration, 
and complexity.  The addition of these aspects would allow for a finer measure of 
competitive aggressiveness and also help address the intensity of competitive 
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aggressiveness previously mentioned.  Improving these measures could also improve the 
differentiation utilized for the analysis of fit among CEO aggressiveness and organization 
aggressiveness.  While the ANOVA utilized the relative levels of these two variables as 
high, medium, and low, it is recognized that the differences among organizations close to 
the cutoffs may have confounded the results.  A more varied measure of aggressiveness 
may have allowed for better delineation of these categories. 
 Another option for future research would be to further the research on relational 
and dyadic aggression between organizations.  While the methodology of this could be 
difficult, the potential insights gained could be very informative.  An interdisciplinary 
approach, drawing on the psychology literature, would assist with this research.  For 
example, dyads and the impact of proactive versus reactive aggression could be studied 
(Coie et al., 1999) in conjunction with competitive responses (Chen et al., 1992a; Lin, 
2006) 
 Another limitation of this research is the choice of industries.  First off, this limits 
the generalizeability somewhat.  Future research should sample from additional industries 
so that we can determine if the relationships are consistent in different contexts.  Also, 
while the automotive industry had a trade publication readily available, access could not 
be gained to a comparable publication for the retail industry.  Business Week was utilized 
as it covers a wide range of industries and the retail industry is a major industry often 
included in their publication.  However, since Business Week does not focus solely on the 
retail industry like Automotive News does with the automotive industry, it is likely that 
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the automotive CEOs and organizations are relatively overrepresented in the sample, with 
more quotes and reports on competitive actions available.  Future research should 
continue to integrate the most comparable publications possible.   
However, at least two fruitful suggestions for future research emerge from this 
aspect.  One suggestion is to align two more similar potential publications, perhaps using 
Aviation Daily and the airline industry, as utilized by Smith et al. (1991), for the second 
industry and trade publication combination.  Another suggestion for future research that 
could address this methodological concern in the future is to perform the analysis using a 
general business publication and a trade publication within the same industry.  This 
would allow for comparisons of how such analyses differ across types of publications, 
providing important insights for future content analyses. 
 The industries selected also impacted the types of competitive actions that could 
be observed.  For example, “new” products in the retail industry are somewhat limited as 
the retailers only sell the products and do not usually develop the products themselves.  
While there were a few product introductions, the possibilities were limited by the choice 
of industry.  Also, there was most likely a reduced opportunity for major innovations as 
compared to other industries, such as some of the more technological fields.  The 
aforementioned greater variety of industries in future research would help address this, as 
would including a wider variety of potential aggressive competitive actions.   
 A greater variety and number of industries in future research could provide other 
benefits as well.  This would improve the generalizeability across industries.  It would 
118 
 
also allow for greater understanding of how other variables impact the relationships 
studied.  For example, the impact of differences in managerial discretion across a greater 
number of industries could be examined.  The increased number and variety of industries 
could provide the opportunity to identify a number of different industry effects ranging 
from competitive intensity to stages in the Product-Market Lifecycle. 
 Future research could also contribute to the literature by obtaining primary data 
on the aggressiveness of the CEOs.  While the use of secondary sources is well-supported 
in the literature (Abrahamson et al., 1997), it may prove beneficial, although difficult,  to 
obtain more direct measures.  Along with the use of primary data, the research could 
examine the whole top management team, which is suggested to be a more effective 
approach (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick et al., 1984).   
 In general, Upper Echelon research has focused on the dominant coalition – the 
top management team (TMT) of an organization – rather than just the CEO.  This is in 
keeping with the suggestion, from the initial article establishing the theory, that 
consideration of the entire team will provide more insights than simply focusing on the 
CEO alone (Hambrick, 2007), although insights can still be obtained through the study of 
individuals.  While this study followed the suggestion that CEOs can substitute as proxies 
for the top management team in research (Hambrick, 2007), future research could utilize 
a design in which the characteristics of all of the top management for an organization is 
considered.   
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 Finally, this research considered only one aspect of personality, aggressiveness.  
Some personality variables have already entered into the literature, among them the Five-
Factor Model (Peterson et al., 2003), narcissism (Resick et al., 2009), and risk propensity 
(Lewin et al., 1994).  However, many options still remain.  An interdisciplinary approach 
would provide endless options for additional aspects of personality that could be included 
in future research.   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 This study sought to explore the relationships between CEO aggressiveness, 
competitive aggressiveness of organizations, and organization performance.  The focus 
was on two primary research questions: “Are organizations with aggressive CEOs more 
likely to undertake aggressive actions?” and “Do organizations whose strategic actions 
are in alignment with the aggressiveness of their CEO perform better?”.  For now, the 
answer to both appears to be “no”.  While the primary hypotheses were not supported, 
several important relationships were identified and many important implications emerged 
from the findings.   
 Those who are responsible for selecting CEOs for organizations should not select 
an individual based on the aggressiveness they have displayed, even in the case of 
organizations seeking to pursue an aggressive strategy.  Furthermore, pursuit of an 
aggressive strategy itself may not be the best course of action for improving organization 
performance.  While the importance of CEOs in their organizations is not in doubt, there 
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is the possibility that not all of a CEO’s characteristics will impact the organization, at 
least not directly.  These results will hopefully provide the foundation for future research 
to increase knowledge in the field of strategy in regards to CEO personalities and the 
impact these personalities can have.   
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